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BANCROFT 
LIBRARY 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OP  CALIFORNIA 


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1 


THE 

AMERICAN  TYPE 

OF 

liTHMIAN  CANAL 


HON.  JOHN  FAIRFIELD  DRTDEN 


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THE  JOHN  F.  DRY  DEN  STATUE 

The  above  is  a  picture  of  the  bronze  statue  of  the  late  United  States  Senator  John  F.  Dryden,  Founder  of  The  Prudential  and 

Pioneer  of  Industrial  insurance   in  America,  erected  by  the  John  F.  Oryden    Metnorial  Assodation,  with  this  inscription: 

A  tribute  of  esteem  and  affection  from  the  field  and  office  force. "    The  statue  is  located  at  the  Home  Office  of  The  Prudential, 

Newark,  N.  J.,  and  is  unique,  being  the  gift  of  a  staff  of  over  16,000  employees.     It  cost  $  i  5,000.     The  sculptor  was  Karl  Birrer 


No.  8 


PANAMA-PACIFIC  EXPOSITION 

MEMORIAL  PUBLICATIONS  OF  THE  PRUDENTIAL 

INSURANCE  COMPANY  OF  AMERICA 


THE  AMERICAN  TYPE 

OF 

ISTHMIAN  CANAL 

SPEECH  BY 

HON.  JOHN  FAIRFIELD  DRYDEN 

IN  THE  SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

JUNE  14,  1906 


1915 
PRUDENTIAI,  PRESS,  NEWARK,  NEW  JERSEY 


1?7 


nnHE  ancient  "Dream  of  Navigators'* 
-^  has  at  last  been  realized  in  the  com- 
pletion and  successful  operation  of  the 
PANAMA  C AN AL,  fittingly  commemo- 
rated hy  the  Panama- Pacific  International 
Exposition.  Among  the  men  who  contrib- 
uted in  a  measurable  degree  to  the  attain- 
ment of  this  national  ideal  was  the  late 
United  States  Senator,  STofjn  Jf .  3©rpben, 
President  of  THE  PRUDENTIAL,  As 
a  member  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Inter- 
oceanic  Canals,  Mr.  Dryden,  after  mature 
and  extended  consideration,  gave  the  weight 
of  his  influence  and  vote  in  favor  of  the  lock- 
level  principle  of  canal  construction.  The 
lock-level  type  was  finally  decided  upon, 
although  the  majority  of  Mr.  Dryden' s 
conferees  and  the  International  Board  of 
Consulting  Engineers  at  first  strongly 
favored  the  sea-level  type.  By  his  deter- 
mined support  of  the  one  and  his  well- 
reasoned  opposition  to  the  other,  Mr. 
Dryden  was  able  to  secure  the  enactment 
of  legislation  in  accordance  with  his  views 
and  to  bring  about  the  completion  of  this 
tremendous  undertaking  within  our  time, 
thus  leaving  a  permanent  imprint  upon 
the  country's  history. 


THE    AMERICAN     TYPE     OF 
ISTHMIAN     CANAL 

It  was  on  June  14,  1906,  when  the  Canal  subject  was  up  for  final  consideration, 
that  Mr.  Dryden  addressed  the  Senate.  The  official  records  show  that  "S.  6191,  to 
provide  for  the  construction  of  a  sea-level  canal  connecting  the  waters  of  the  Atlantic 
and  Pacific  oceans,  and  the  method  of  construction,"  was  before  Congress,  and  it  was 
in  opposition  to  this  measure  that  Mr.  Dryden  patriotically  pledged  his  devotion  to 
American  enterprise  and  American  ability  by  declaring  for  the  lock-level  type  of  canal, 
built  by  American  engineers  and  under  American  supervision,  concluding  with  the 
following  words,  which  deserve  to  be  recalled  on  this  memorable  occasion  as  a  tribute 
to  the  native  genius  and  enterprise  of  the  American  people: 

"I  am  entirely  convinced  that  the  judgment  and  experience  of  American  engineers 
in  favor  of  a  lock  canal  may  be  relied  upon  with  entire  confidence  and  that  such  an 
enterprise  will  be  brought  to  a  successful  termination.  I  beheve  that  in  a  national 
undertaking  of  this  kind,  fraught  with  the  gravest  possible  political  and  commercial 
consequences,  only  the  judgment  of  our  own  people  should  govern,  for  the  protection 
of  our  own  interests,  which  are  primarily  at  stake.  I  also  prefer  to  accept  the  view 
and  convictions  of  the  members  of  the  Isthmian  Commission,  and  of  its  chief  engi- 
neer, a  man  of  extraordinary  ability  and  large  experience.  It  is  a  subject  upon  which 
opinions  will  differ  and  upon  which  honest  convictions  may  be  widely  at  variance, 
but  in  a  question  of  such  surpassing  importance  to  the  nation,  I,  for  one,  shall  side 
with  those  who  take  the  American  point  of  view,  place  their  reliance  upon  American 
experience,  and  show  their  faith  in  American  engineers." 

The  Panama  Canal  problem  has  reached  a  stage  where  a  decision 
should  be  made  to  fix  permanently  the  type  of  the  waterway, 
whether  it  shall  be  a  sea-level  or  a  lock  canal.  An  immense  amount 
of  evidence  on  the  subject  has  in  the  past  and  during  recent  years 
been  presented  to  Congress.  An  overwhelming  amount  of  expert 
opinion  has  been  collected,  and  an  International  Board  of  Consulting 
Engineers  has  made  a  final  report  to  the  President,  in  which  experts  of 
the  highest  standing  divide  upon  the  question.  The  Senate  Commit- 
tee on  Interoceanic  Canals  has  likewise  divided.  It  is  an  issue  of  trans- 
cendent importance,  involving  the  expenditure  of  an  enormous  sum 
of  money,  and  political  and  commercial  consequences  of  the  greatest 
magnitude,  not  only  to  the  American  people,  but  to  the  world  at  large. 

The  report  of  the  International  Board  has  been  printed  and  placed 
before  Congress.  A  critical  discussion  of  the  facts  and  opinion  pre- 
sented by  this  Board,  all  more  or  less  of  a  technical  and  involved  nature, 
would  unduly  impose  upon  the  time  of  the  Senate  at  this  late  day  of  the 
session.  In  addition,  there  is  the  testimony  of  witnesses  called  before 
the  Senate  committee,  which  has  also  been  printed  in  three  large 
volumes,  exceeding  3,000  pages  of  printed  matter.  To  properly 
separate  the  evidence  for  and  against  one  type  of  canal  or  the  other,  to 
argue  upon  the  facts,  which  present  the  greatest  conflict  of  engineering 
opinion  of  modern  times,  would  be  a  mere  waste  of  effort  and  time, 
since  the  evidence  and  opinions  are  as  far  apart  and  as  irreconcilable 
as  the  final  conclusions  themselves.  It  is,  therefore,  rather  a  question 
which  the  practical  experience  and  judgment  of  members  of  Congress 
must  decide,  and  I  have  entire  confidence  that  the  will  of  the  nation, 
as  expressed  in  its  final  mandate,  will  be  carried  into  successful  execu- 
tion, whether  that  mandate  be  for  lock  canal  or  sea-level  waterway. 


The  Panama  Canal  presents  at  once  the  most  interesting  and  the 
most  stupendous  project  of  mankind  to  overcome  by  human  ingenuity 
"what  Nature  herself  seems  to  have  attempted,  but  in  vain/'  From 
the  time  when  the  first  Spanish  navigators  extended  their  explorations 
into  every  bay  and  inlet  of  the  Central  American  isthmus,  to  discover, 
if  possible,  a  short  route  to  the  Indies,  or  "from  Cadiz  to  Cathay," 
the  human  mind  has  not  been  willing  to  rest  content  and  accept  as 
insurmountable  the  natural  obstacles  on  the  Isthmus  which  prevent 
uninterrupted  communication  between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific. 
Excepting,  possibly,  Arctic  explorations,  in  all  the  romantic  history  of 
ancient  and  modern  commerce,  in  all  the  annals  of  the  early  navigators 
and  explorers,  there  is  no  chapter  that  equals  in  interest  the  never- 
ceasing  efforts  to  make  the  Central  American  isthmus  a  natural  high- 
way for  the  world's  commerce — a  direct  route  of  trade  and  transporta- 
tion from  the  uttermost  East  to  the  uttermost  West. 

As  early  as  1536  Charles  V  ordered  an  exploration  of  the  Chagres 
River  to  learn  whether  a  ship  canal  could  not  be  substituted  for  an 
existing  wagon  road,  and  Philip  II,  in  1561,  had  a  similar  survey  made 
in  Nicaragua  for  the  same  purpose.  From  that  day  to  this  the  greatest 
minds  in  commerce  and  engineering  have  given  their  attention  to  the 
problem  of  an  interoceanic  waterway ;  every  conceivable  plan  has  been 
considered,  every  possible  road  has  been  explored,  and  every  mile  of 
land  and  sea  has  been  gone  over  to  find  the  best  and  most  practical 
solution  of  the  problem. 

The  history  of  these  early  attempts  is  most  interesting,  but  it  is  no 
longer  of  practical  value,  for  it  has  no  direct  bearing  upon  present-day 
problems.  Most  of  the  efforts  were  wasted,  and  many  of  them  were  ill 
advised,  but  the  present  can  profitably  consider  the  more  important 
lessons  of  the  past.  It  was  written  in  the  book  of  fate  that  this 
enterprise,  the  most  important  in  the  world  of  commerce  and  naviga- 
tion, should  be  American  in  its  ending  as  it  had  been  in  its  practical 
beginning.  From  the  day  when  the  first  train  of  cars  crossed  the 
Isthmus  from  Panama  to  Aspinwall,  to  facilitate  the  transportation 
of  passengers  and  freight  across  the  narrow  belt  of  land  connecting  the 
northern  and  southern  continents,  the  imperative  necessity  of  a  ship 
canal  was  made  apparent.  Just  as  the  railway  followed  the  earlier 
wagon  roads  of  the  Spanish  adventurers,  so  a  ship  canal  will  naturally 
succeed  or  supplement  the  railway. 

Natural  conditions  on  the  Isthmus  materially  enhance  the  physical 
difficulties  to  be  overcome  in  canal  construction.  Even  the  precise 
locality  or  section  best  adapted  to  the  purpose  has  for  many  years  been 
a  question  of  serious  doubt.  The  Isthmus  of  Tehuantepec,  the 
Nicaraguan  route,  the  utilizing  of  a  lake  of  large  extent,  and  finally  the 
narrow  band  of  land  and  mountain  chain  at  Panama,  each  offers 


distinct  advantages  peculiar  to  itself,  with  corresponding  disadvantages 
or  local  difficulties  not  met  with  in  the  others.  Many  other  projects 
have  been  advanced ;  in  all,  at  least  some  twenty  distinct  routes  have 
been  laid  out  by  scientific  surveys,  but  the  most  eminent  American 
engineering  talent,  considering  impartially  the  natural  advantages  and 
local  obstacles  of  each,  finally,  in  1849,  decided  upon  the  isthmus  be- 
tween the  Bay  of  Panama  and  Limon  Bay  as  the  most  feasible  for  the 
building  of  the  railroad,  and  some  fifty  years  later  for  the  building  of 
the  Isthmian  Canal.  Every  further  study,  survey,  and  inquiry  has 
confirmed  the  wisdom  of  the  earlier  choice,  which  has  been  adopted 
as  the  best  and  as  the  permanent  plan  of  the  American  government, 
which  is  now  to  build  a  canal  at  the  expense  of  the  nation,  but  for  the 
ultimate  benefit  of  all  mankind. 

The  Panama  railway  marked  the  beginning  of  a  new  era  in  the 
history  of  interoceanic  communication.  The  great  practical  useful- 
ness of  the  road  soon  made  the  construction  of  a  canal  a  commercial 
necessity.  The  eyes  of  all  the  world  were  upon  the  Isthmus,  but  no 
nation  made  the  subject  a  matter  of  more  profound  study  and  inquiry 
than  the  United  States.  One  surveying  party  followed  another,  and 
every  promising  project  received  careful  consideration.  The  con- 
flicting evidence,  the  great  engineering  difficulties,  the  natural  ob- 
stacles, and,  most  of  all,  the  Civil  War,  delayed  active  efforts;  but 
public  interest  was  maintained  and  the  general  public  continued  to 
view  the  project  with  favor  and  to  demand  an  American  canal. 

During  the  seventies  a  French  commission  made  surveys  and 
investigations  on  the  Isthmus  which  terminated  in  the  efforts  of  De 
Lesseps,  who  undertook  to  construct  a  canal,  and,  in  1879,  called  an 
international  scientific  congress  to  consider  the  project  in  all  its 
aspects  and  determine  upon  a  practical  solution.  The  United  States 
was  invited  to  be  represented  by  two  official  delegates,  and  accordingly 
President  Hayes  appointed  Admiral  Ammen  and  A.  C.  Menocal,  of 
the  United  States  Navy,  both  of  whom  had  been  connected  with 
surveys  and  explorations  on  the  Isthmus.  Mr.  Menocal  presented 
his  plan  for  a  canal  by  way  of  Nicaragua,  but  it  was  evident  that  the 
Wyse  project,  of  a  canal  by  way  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  had  the 
majority  in  its  favor,  and  the  only  question  to  determine  was  whether 
the  canal  to  be  constructed  should  be  a  sea-level  or  a  lock  canal.  The 
American  delegates  were  convinced,  in  the  light  of  their  knowledge 
and  experience,  that  a  sea-level  canal  would  be  impracticable,  if  not 
impossible.  In  this  they  were  seconded  by  Sir  John  Hawkshaw,  a 
man  thoroughly  familiar  with  canal  problems,  and  who  exposed  the 
hopelessness  of  an  attempt  to  make  a  sea-level  ship  canal,  pointing 
out  that  there  would  be  a  cataract  of  the  Chagres  River  at  Matachin 
of  42  feet,  which  in  periods  of  floods  would  be  78  feet  high,  and  a  body 
of  water  that  would  be  36  feet  deep,  with  a  width  of   1,500  feet. 

5 


opposition  to  the  sea-level  project  proved  of  no  avail.  The  facts 
were  ignored  or  treated  with  indifference  by  the  French,  who  were 
determined  upon  a  canal  at  Panama  and  at  sea  level,  resting  their 
conclusions  upon  the  success  at  Suez,  with  which  enterprise  many  of 
those  present  at  the  congress,  in  addition  to  De  Lesseps,  had  been 
connected.  But  the  problems  and  conditions  to  be  met  on  the  Isthmus 
of  Panama  were  decidedly  different  from  those  at  Suez,  and  subse- 
quent experience  proved  the  serious  error  of  the  sea-level  plan  as  finally 
adopted.  The  congress  included  a  large  assemblage  of  non-profes- 
sional men,  and  of  the  French  engineers  present  only  one  or  two  had 
ever  been  on  the  Isthmus.  The  final  vote  was  seventy-five  in  favor  of 
and  eight  opposed  to  a  sea-level  canal.  Rear-admiral  Ammen  said: 
"I  abstained  from  voting  on  the  ground  that  only  able  engineers  can 
form  an  opinion  after  careful  study  of  what  is  actually  possible  and  what 
is  relatively  economical  in  the  construction  of  a  ship  canal."  Of  those 
in  favor  of  a  sea-level  canal  not  one  had  made  a  practical  and  ex- 
haustive study  of  the  facts.  The  project  at  this  stage  was  in  a  state 
of  hopeless  confusion.  In  spite  of  these  obstacles,  De  Lesseps,  with 
undaunted  courage,  proceeded  to  organize  a  company  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  sea-level  canal. 

As  soon  as  possible  after  the  adjournment  of  the  scientific  congress 
of  1879  the  Panama  Canal  Company  was  organized,  with  Ferdinand 
De  Lesseps  as  president.  The  company  purchased  the  Wyse  con- 
cession, and  by  1880  sufficient  funds  had  been  secured  to  proceed  with 
the  preliminary  work.  The  next  two  years  were  used  for  scientific 
investigations,  surveys,  etc.,  and  the  actual  work  commenced  in  1883. 
The  plan  adopted  was  for  a  sea-level  canal  having  a  depth  of  29.5  feet 
and  a  bottom  width  of  72  feet.  This  plan  in  outline  and  intent  was 
adhered  to  practically  to  the  cessation  of  operations  in  1888. 

In  that  year  operations  on  the  Isthmus  came  to  an  end  for  want  of 
funds.  The  failure  of  the  company  proved  disastrous  to  a  very  large 
number  of  shareholders,  mostly  French  peasants  of  small  means,  and 
for  a  time  the  project  of  interoceanic  communication  by  way  of  Pan- 
ama seemed  hopeless.  The  experience,  however,  proved  clearly  the 
utter  impossibility  of  private  enterprise  carrying  forward  a  project 
of  such  magnitude  and  which  had  attained  a  stage  where  large  addi- 
tional funds  were  needed  to  make  good  enormous  losses,  due  to  errors 
in  plans,  to  miscarriage  of  effort,  and,  last  but  not  least,  to  fraud  on 
stupendous  scale.  With  admirable  courage,  however,  the  affairs  of 
the  first  Panama  Canal  Company  were  reorganized,  after  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  receiver,  on  February  4,  1889.  A  scientific  commission  of 
inquiry  was  appointed  to  reinvestigate  the  entire  project  and  report 
upon  the  work  actually  accomplished  and  its  value  in  future  operations. 
The  commission,  made  up  of  eminent  engineers,  sent  five  of  its  mem- 
bers to  the  Isthmus  to  study  the  technical  aspects  of  the  problem,  and 

6 


a  final  report  was  rendered  on  May  5,  1890.  The  recommendation  of 
the  commission  was  for  the  construction  of  a  canal  with  locks,  the 
abandonment  of  the  sea-level  idea,  and  for  a  further  and  still  more 
thorough  inquiry  into  the  facts,  upon  the  ground  that  the  accumulated 
data  were  "far  from  possessing  the  precision  essential  to  a  definite 
project."  This  took  the  project  of  canal  construction  out  of  the 
domain  of  preconceived  ideas  based  upon  guesswork  into  the  substan- 
tial field  of  a  scientific  undertaking  for  commercial  purposes.  The 
receiver  at  once  commenced  to  reorganize  the  affairs  of  the  company, 
and  accordingly,  on  October  21,  1894,  the  new  Panama  Canal  Com- 
pany came  into  existence  under  the  general  laws  of  France.  The 
charter  of  the  new  company  provided  for  the  appointment  of  a  tech- 
nical committee  to  formulate  a  final  project  for  the  completion  of  the 
canal.  This  committee  was  organized  in  February,  1896,  and  reached 
a  unanimous  conclusion  on  November  16,  1898,  embodied  in  an  elabo- 
rate report,  which  is  probably  the  most  authoritative  document  ever 
presented  on  an  engineering  subject.  The  recommendation  of  the 
commission  was  unanimously  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal.* 

The  subsequent  history  of  the  De  Lesseps  project  and  the  American 
effort  for  a  practical  route  across  the  Isthmus  are  still  fresh  in  our  minds 
and  need  not  be  restated.  The  Spanish-American  war  and  the  voy- 
age of  the  Oregon  by  way  of  Cape  Horn,  more  than  any  other  causes, 
combined  to  direct  the  attention  of  the  American  people  to  conditions 
on  the  Isthmus,  and  led  to  the  public  demand  that  by  one  route  or 
another  an  American  waterway  be  constructed  within  a  reasonable 
period  of  time  and  at  a  reasonable  cost.  It  will  serve  no  practical 
purpose  to  recite  the  subsequent  facts  and  the  chain  of  events  which 
led  to  the  passage  of  the  act  of  March  3,  1899,  which  authorized  the 
President  to  have  a  full  and  complete  investigation  made  of  the  entire 
subject  of  Isthmian  canals. 

A  million  dollars  was  appropriated  for  the  expenses  of  a  commis- 
sion, and  in  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of  the  act  the  President  ap- 
pointed a  commission  consisting  of  Rear-admiral  Walker,  United 
States  Navy,  president,  and  nine  members  eminent  in  their  respective 
professions  as  experts  or  engineers.  A  report  was  rendered  under  the 
date  of  November  30,  1901,  in  which  the  cost  of  constructing  a  canal 
by  way  of  Nicaragua  was  estimated  at  $189,864,062  and  by  way  of 
Panama  at  $184,233,358,  including  in  the  last  estimate  $40,000,000 
for  the  estimated  value  of  the  rights  and  property  of  the  New  Panama 
Canal  Company.  The  company,  however,  held  its  property  at  a  much 
higher  value,  or  some  $109,000,000,  which  the  Commission  considered 
exorbitant,  and  thus  the  only  alternative  was  to  recommend  the  con- 
struction of  a  canal  by  way  of  the  Nicaraguan  route.     Convinced, 


♦Report  of  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company  of  France;  Senate  Document  188,  56th  Congress, 
1st  session,  February  20,  1900. 


however,  that  the  American  people  were  in  earnest,  the  New  Panama 
Company  expressed  a  wilUngness  to  reconsider  the  matter,  and  finally- 
agreed  to  the  purchase  price  fixed  by  the  Isthmian  Commission. 

By  the  Spooner  act,  passed  June  28,  1902,  Congress  authorized  the 
President  to  purchase  the  property  of  the  New  Panama  Canal  Com- 
pany for  a  price  not  exceeding  $40,000,000,  the  title  to  the  property 
having  been  fully  investigated  and  found  valid.  The  Isthmian  Com- 
mission, therefore,  recommended  to  Congress  the  purchase  of  the 
property,  but  the  majority  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Interoceanic 
Canals  disagreed,  and  it  is  only  to  the  courage  and  rare  ability  of  the 
late  Senator  Hanna  and  his  associates,  as  minority  members  of  the 
committee,  that  the  nation  owes  the  abandonment  of  the  Nicaraguan 
project,  the  acquirement  of  the  Panama  Canal  rights  at  a  reasonable 
price  and  the  making  of  the  project  a  national  enterprise. 

The  report  of  the  minority  members  of  the  Senate  committee  was 
made  under  date  of  May  31,  1902.  It  is,  without  question,  a  most  able 
and  comprehensive  dissertation  upon  the  subject,  and  forms  a  most 
valuable  addition  to  the  truly  voluminous  literature  of  Isthmian  canal 
construction.  The  report  was  signed  by  Senators  Hanna,  Pritchard, 
Millard,  and  Kittredge.  '*We  consider,"  said  the  committee,  "that 
the  Panama  route  is  the  best  route  for  an  isthmian  canal  to  be  owned, 
constructed,  controlled,  and  protected  by  the  United  States."  It  was 
a  bold  challenge  of  the  conclusions  of  the  majority  members  of  the 
committee,  but  in  entire  harmony  with  and  in  strict  conformity  to  the 
views  and  final  conclusions  of  the  Isthmian  Commission.  The 
minority  report  was  accepted  by  the  Congress  and  a  canal  at  Panama 
became  an  American  enterprise  for  the  benefit  of  the  American  people 
and  the  world  at  large. 

Such,  in  broad  outline,  is  the  present  status  of  the  Panama  Canal. 
A  grave  question  presents  itself  at  this  time,  which  demands  to  be 
disposed  of  by  Congress,  and  to  which  all  others  are  subservient. 
Shall  the  waterway  be  a  sea-level  or  a  lock  canal?  It  is  a  question  of 
tremendous  importance — a  question  of  choice  equally  as  important 
as  the  one  of  the  route  itself.  A  choice  must  be  made,  and  it  must  be 
made  soon.  All  the  subsidiary  work,  all  the  related  enterprises,  de- 
pend upon  the  fundamental  difference  in  type.  Opinions  differ  as 
widely  to-day  as  they  did  at  the  time  when  the  project  was  first  con- 
sidered by  the  international  committee  in  1879.  Engineers  of  the 
highest  standing  at  home  and  abroad  have  expressed  themselves  for 
or  against  one  type  or  the  other,  but  it  is  a  question  upon  which  no 
complete  agreement  is  possible.  In  theory  a  sea-level  canal  has  un- 
questionable advantages,  but,  practically,  the  elements  of  cost  and 
time  necessary  for  the  construction  preclude  to-day,  as  they  did  in 
1894,  when  the  New  Canal  Company  recommenced  active  operations, 
the  building  of  a  sea-level  canal.     It  is  not  a  question  of  the  ideally 


most  desirable,  but  of  the  practically  most  expedient,  that  confronts  the 
American  people  and  demands  solution. 

The  New  Panama  Canal  Company  had  approved  the  lock  plan, 
which  placed  the  minimum  elevation  of  the  summit  level  at  97.5  feet 
above  the  sea  and  the  maximum  level  at  102.5  feet  above  the  same 
datum.     In  the  words  of  Prof.  William  H.  Burr: 

It  provided  for  a  depth  of  29.5  feet  of  water  and  a  bottom  width  of  canal  prism  of 
about  98  feet,  except  at  special  places,  where  this  width  was  increased.  A  dam  was 
to  be  built  near  Bohio,  which  would  thus  form  an  artificial  lake,  with  its  surface 
varying  from  52.5  to  65.6  feet  above  the  sea.  The  location  of  this  line  was  practi- 
cally the  same  as  that  of  the  old  company.  The  available  length  of  each  lock  cham- 
ber was  738  feet,  while  the  available  width  was  82  feet,  the  depth  in  the  clear  being 
32  feet  10  inches.  The  lifts  were  to  vary  from  26  to  33  feet.  It  was  estimated  that 
the  cost  of  finishing  the  canal  on  this  plan  would  be  $101,850,000,  exclusive  of  ad- 
minstration  and  financing. 

The  Isthmian  Commission  of  1899-1901  considered  the  project, 
reexamined  into  the  facts,  and  as  stated  by  Professor  Burr — 

The  feasibility  of  a  sea-level  canal,  but  with  a  tidal  lock  at  the  Panama  end,  was 
carefully  considered  by  the  Commission,  and  an  approximate  estimate  of  the  cost  of 
completing  the  work  on  that  plan  was  made.  In  round  numbers  this  estimated  cost 
was  about  $250,000,000,  and  the  time  required  to  complete  the  work  would  probably  be 
nearly  or  quite  twice  that  needed  for  the  construction  of  a  canal  with  locks.  The  Commis- 
sion therefore  adopted  a  project  for  the  canal  locks.  Both  plans  and  estimates  were 
carefully  developed  in  accordance  therewith. 

Professor  Burr,  now  in  favor  of  a  sea-level  canal,  then  concurred  in 
the  report  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal. 

Since  the  Panama  canal  became  the  property  of  the  nation  a  vast 
amount  of  necessary  and  preliminary  work  has  been  done  preparatory 
to  the  actual  construction  of  the  canal.  A  complete  civil  government 
of  the  Canal  Zone  has  been  established,  an  army  of  experts  and  engi- 
neers has  been  organized,  the  work  of  sanitation  and  police  control  is 
in  excellent  hands,  and  the  Isthmus,  or,  more  properly  speaking,  the 
Canal  Zone,  is  to-day  in  a  better,  cleaner,  and  more  healthful  condition 
than  at  any  previous  time  in  its  history.  A  considerable  amount  of 
excavation  and  necessary  improvements  in  transportation  facilities 
have  been  carried  to  a  point  where  further  work  must  stop  until  the 
Isthmian  Commission  knows  the  final  plan  or  type  of  the  canal.  The 
reports  which  have  been  made  of  the  work  of  the  Commission  during 
its  two  years  of  actual  control  are  a  complete  and  affirmative  answer  to 
the  question  whether  what  has  been  done  so  far  has  been  done  wisely 
and  well,  and  the  facts  and  evidence  prove  that  the  present  state  of 
affairs  on  the  Isthmus  is  in  all  respects  to  the  credit  of  the  nation. 

Now,  it  is  evident  that  the  question  of  plan  or  type  of  canal  is  largely 
one  for  engineers  to  determine,  but  even  a  layman  can  form  an  in- 
telligent opinion,  without  entering  into  all  the  details  of  so  complex  a 

9 


problem  as  the  relative  advantage  or  disadvantage  of  a  sea-level  versus 
a  lock  canal.  This  much,  however,  is  readily  apparent,  that  a  sea- 
level  canal  will  cost  a  vast  amount  of  money  and  may  take  twice  the 
time  to  build,  while  it  will  not  necessarily  accommodate  a  larger  traffic 
or  ships  of  a  larger  size.  A  lock  canal  can  be  built  which  will  meet 
all  requirements;  it  can  be  built  deep  enough  and  wide  enough  to 
accommodate  the  largest  vessels  afloat;  it  can  be  so  built  that  transit 
across  the  Isthmus  can  be  effected  in  a  reasonably  short  period  of  time 
— in  a  word,  it  is  a  practical  project,  which  will  solve  every  pending 
question  involved  in  the  construction  of  a  transisthmian  canal  in  a 
practical  way,  at  a  reasonable  cost,  and  within  a  reasonable  period  of 
time. 

To  determine  the  question  the  President  appointed  an  International 
Board  of  Consulting  Engineers.  The  Board  included  in  its  member- 
ship the  world's  foremost  men  in  engineering  science,  and  the  report 
is  without  question  a  most  valuable  document.  The  President,  in  his 
address  to  the  members  of  the  Board  on  September  11,  1905,  outlined 
his  views  with  regard  to  the  desirability  of  a  sea-level  canal,  if  such  a 
one  could  be  constructed  at  a  reasonable  cost  within  a  reasonable  time. 
He  said — 

If  to  build  a  sea-level  canal  will  but  slightly  increase  the  risk  and  will  take  but 
little  longer  than  a  multilock  high-level  canal,  this,  of  course,  is  preferable.  But  if 
to  adopt  the  plan  of  a  sea-level  canal  means  to  incur  great  hazard  and  to  incur 
indefinite  delay,  then  it  is  not  preferable. 

The  problem  as  viewed  by  the  American  people  could  not  be  more 
concisely  stated.  Other  things  equal,  a  sea-level  canal,  no  doubt, 
would  be  preferable;  but  it  remains  to  be  shown  that  such  a  canal 
would  in  all  essentials  provide  safe,  cheap,  and  earlier  navigation 
across  the  Isthmus  than  a  lock  canal. 

For,  as  the  President  further  said  on  the  same  occasion,  there  are 
two  essential  considerations:  First,  the  greatest  possible  speed  of 
construction  ;  second,  the  practical  certainty  that  the  proposed  plan 
will  be  feasible;  that  it  can  be  carried  out  with  the  minimum  risk ;  and  in 
conclusion  that — 

There  may  be  good  reason  why  the  delay  incident  to  the  adoption  of  a  plan  for  an 
ideal  canal  should  be  incurred;  but  if  there  is  not,  then  I  hope  to  see  the  canal  con- 
structed on  a  system  which  will  bring  to  the  nearest  possible  date  in  the  future  the 
time  when  it  is  practicable  to  take  the  first  ship  across  the  Isthmus — that  is,  which 
will  in  the  shortest  time  possible  secure  a  Panama  waterway  between  the  oceans  of 
such  a  character  as  to  guarantee  permanent  and  ample  communication  for  the  greatest 
ships  of  our  Navy  and  for  the  largest  steamers  on  either  the  Atlantic  or  the  Pacific. 
The  delay  in  transit  of  the  vessels  owing  to  additional  locks  would  be  of  small  conse- 
quence when  compared  with  shortening  the  time  for  the  construction  of  the  canal  or 
diminishing  the  risks  in  the  construction.  In  short,  I  desire  yoiu-  best  judgment  on 
all  the  various  questions  to  be  considered  in  choosing  among  the  various  plans  for  a 
comparatively  high-level  multilock  canal,  for  a  lower-level  canal  with  fewer  locks,  and 

10 


for  a  sea-level  canal.     Finally,  I  urge  upon  you  the  necessity  of  as  great  expedition  in 
coming  to  a  decision  as  is  compatible  with  thoroughness  in  considering  the  conditions. 

The  Board  organized  and  met  in  the  city  of  Washington  on  Septem- 
ber 1,  1905,  and  on  the  10th  of  January,  1906,  or  about  four  months 
later,  made  its  final  report  to  the  President  through  the  Secretary  of 
War.  The  Board  divided  upon  the  question  of  type  for  the  proposed 
canal,  a  majority  of  eight — five  foreign  engineers  and  three  American 
engineers — being  in  favor  of  a  canal  at  sea-level,  while  a  minority  of 
five — all  American  engineers — favored  a  lock  canal  at  a  summit  level 
of  eighty-five  feet.  The  two  propositions  require  separate  considera- 
tion, each  upon  its  own  merits,  before  a  final  opinion  can  be  arrived 
at  as  to  the  best  type  of  a  waterway  adapted  to  our  needs  and  re- 
quirements under  existing  conditions. 

Upon  a  question  so  involved  and  complex,  where  the  most  eminent 
engineers  divide  and  disagree,  a  layman  can  not  be  expected  to  view 
the  problem  otherwise  than  as  a  business  proposition  which,  demand- 
ing solution,  must  be  disposed  of  by  a  strictly  impartial  examination  of 
the  facts.  Weighed  and  tested  by  practical  experience  in  other  fields 
of  commercial  enterprise,  it  is  probably  not  going  too  far  to  say,  as 
in  fact  it  has  been  said,  that  there  is  entirely  too  much  mere  engineering 
opinion  upon  this  subject  and  not  a  well-defined  concentrated  mass  of 
data  and  solid  convictions.  It  is  equally  true,  and  should  be  kept  in 
mind,  that  the  time  given  by  the  Board  to  the  consideration  of  the 
subject  in  all  its  practical  bearings,  including  an  examination  of  actual 
conditions  on  the  Isthmus,  was  limited  to  so  short  a  period  that  it 
would  be  contrary  to  all  human  experience  that  this  report  should 
represent  an  infallible  or  final  verdict  for  or  against  either  of  the  two 
propositions. 

It  is  necessary  to  keep  in  mind  certain  facts  which  may  be  concisely 
stated,  and  which  I  do  not  think  have  been  previously  brought  to  the 
attention  of  Congress.  While  the  Board  had  been  appointed  by  the 
President  on  June  24,  1905,  the  first  business  meeting  did  not  take 
place  until  September  1st,  and  the  final  meeting  of  the  full  Board  oc- 
curred on  November  24th  of  the  same  year.  This  was  the  twenty- 
seventh  meeting  during  a  period  of  eighty-five  days,  after  which  there 
were  three  more  meetings  of  the  American  members,  the  last  having 
been  held  on  January  31,  1906.  Thus  the  actual  proceedings  of  the  full 
Board  were  condensed  into  twenty-seven  meetings  during  less  than 
three  months,  a  part  of  which  time — or,  to  be  specific,  six  days — was 
spent  on  the  Isthmus. 

The  minutes  of  the  proceedings  have  been  printed  and  form  a  part 
of  the  final  report  made  to  the  President  under  date  of  January  10, 
1906.  They  do  not  afford  as  complete  an  insight  into  the  business 
transactions  of  the  Board  as  would  be  desirable,  and  the  evidence  is 
wanting  that  the  subject  was  as  thoroughly  discussed  in  all  its  details, 

11 


with  particular  reference  to  the  two  propositions  of  a  sea-level  or  a 
lock  canal,  as  would  seem  necessary.  Very  important  features  neces- 
sary to  the  sea-level  plan  were  treated  in  the  most  superficial  way, 
guessed  at,  or  wholly  ignored.  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  no  bank- 
ing house  in  the  world  called  upon  to  provide  funds  necessary  for  an 
enterprise  of  this  magnitude  as  a  private  undertaking  would  advance  a 
single  dollar  upon  a  project  as  it  is  here  presented  by  the  majority 
of  the  Board  to  the  American  Congress  as  the  final  conclusion  of  engi- 
neers of  the  highest  standing.  The  Board,  as  I  have  said,  divided 
upon  the  question,  and  by  a  majority  of  eight  pronounced  in  favor  of  a 
sea-level  against  a  minority  of  five  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal.  Let  us 
inquire  how  this  conclusion,  of  momentous  importance  to  the  nation, 
was  arrived  at  and  whether  the  minutes  of  the  Board  furnish  a  conclu- 
sive answer. 

As  early  as  the  sixth  meeting,  or  on  September  16th — that  is,  after 
the  Board  had  been  only  fifteen  days  in  existence — a  resolution  was 
introduced  by  Mr.  Hunter,  chief  engineer  of  the  Manchester  Ship 
Canal,  requesting  that  a  special  committee  be  appointed  to  prepare  at 
once  a  project  for  a  sea-level  canal. 

Mr.  Spooner. — What  was  the  date  of  the  resolution  with  respect  to 
the  lock  canal? 

Mr.  Dry  den. — October  3d,  seventeen  days  afterwards. 

In  marked  contrast,  it  was  not  until  after  the  Board  had  visited  the 
Isthmus  and  while  the  members  were  on  their  way  home — that  is,  at 
sea — on  October  3d,  that,  on  motion  of  Mr.  Stearns,  a  corresponding 
committee  was  appointed  to  prepare  plans  for  a  lock  canal.  The 
recital  of  dates  is  of  very  considerable  importance,  for  it  is  evident  that 
there  was  a  decided  and  early  preference  on  the  part  of  certain  mem- 
bers of  the  Board  for  a  sea-level  canal,  and  that  to  this  particular 
project  more  attention  was  given  and  a  more  determined  attempt  was 
made  to  secure  data  in  its  defense  than  to  the  corresponding  project 
for  a  lock  canal.  That  is  to  say,  while  the  special  committee  for  the 
consideration  of  a  sea-level  canal  had  been  appointed  on  September 
16th,  the  corresponding  committee  to  consider  the  lock  project  was  not 
appointed  until  October  3d,  or  seventeen  days  later,  with  the  additional 
disadvantage  of  the  Board  being  on  the  ocean,  with  no  opportunity  to 
send  for  persons  and  papers  during  the  short  period  of  time  remaining 
to  take  into  due  consideration  all  the  facts  pertaining  to  a  lock  canal, 
for,  as  I  have  said  before,  the  last  business  meeting  was  held  on  Novem- 
ber 24th. 

Mr.  Foraker. — Mr.  President 


The  Vice  President. — Does  the  Senator  from  New  Jersey  yield  to  the 
Senator  from  Ohio? 

12 


Mr.  Dryden. — Certainly. 

Mr.  Foraker. — I  would  like  to  ask  the  Senator  whether  on  the  16th 
of  September,  when  this  motion  was  made  by  Mr.  Hunter,  if  I  remem- 
ber correctly,  the  Board  of  Engineers  had  completed  their  investiga- 
tions and  explorations  on  the  Isthmus?     I  did  not  observe. 

Mr.  Dryden. — No. 

Mr.  Kittredge. — Mr.  President 

The  Vice  President. — Does  the  Senator  from  New  Jersey  yield  to  the 
Senator  from  South  Dakota? 

Mr. ^Dryden. — I  yield. 

Mr.  Kittredge. — If  the  Senator  from  New  Jersey  will  permit  me,  I  will 
be  glad  to  answer  the  question  of  the  Senator  from  Ohio.  The  Board 
of  Consulting  Engineers  sailed  from  New  York  on  the  28th  of  Septem- 
ber for  the  Isthmus  and  returned  about  the  middle  or  20th  of  October. 

Mr.  Foraker. — Sailed  from  the  Isthmus? 

Mr.  Kittredge. — Sailed  from  New  York  for  the  Isthmus. 

Mr.  Foraker. — Then  the  motion  was  made  by  Mr.  Hunter  before  the 
Board  of  Engineers  left  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Kittredge. — Certainly;  to  appoint  a  committee  of  investigation. 

Mr.  Dryden. — I  should  like  to  say  at  this  point  that  while  I  have 
gladly  yielded  to  Senators,  I  think  it  is  quite  probable  that  before  I 
get  through  I  shall  cover  any  questions  that  may  be  asked.  I  would 
prefer  to  complete  my  remarks,  and  then  I  shall  be  very  glad  to  answer 
any  questions  that  Senators  may  choose  to  ask. 

Mr.  Foraker. — I  beg  pardon. 

Mr.  Dryden. — I  was  glad  to  yield  to  the  Senator. 

Mr.  Foraker. — The  speech  is  a  very  interesting  one. 

Mr.  Dryden. — There  is  nothing  in  the  minutes  of  the  Board  which 
disclosed  that  either  proposition  received  the  necessary  deliberate 
consideration  of  the  extremely  complex  and  important  details  entering 
into  the  two  respective  projects,  but  it  is  evident  that,  regarding  the 
sea-level  proposition  at  least,  there  was  a  decided  bias  practically  from 
the  outset,  which  matured  in  the  majority  report  favoring  that  propo- 
sition. What  was  in  the  minds  of  the  members,  what  was  done  out- 
side of  the  Board  meetings,  by  what  means  or  methods  conclusions 
were  reached,  has  not  been  made  a  matter  of  record  and  is  not,  there- 
fore, within  the  knowledge  of  Congress. 

It  is  true  that  the  respective  reports  of  the  two  committees  were 
brought  before  the  Board  as  a  whole  on  November  14th  and  that  the 
subject  was  discussed  at  some  length  on  November  18th,  when  each 
member  of  the  Board  expressed  his  views  for  or  against  one  of  the  two 
projects.  But  there  remained  only  ten  days  before  the  last  business 
meeting  of  the  Board  was  held,  when  the  foreign  members  sailed  for 
home.     The  final  reports,  as  they  are  now  before  Congress,  apparently 


never  received  the  proper  and  extended  consideration  of  the  Board  as 
a  whole,  and  the  minority  report  favoring  a  lock  canal  seems  never  to 
have  been  discussed  upon  its  merits  at  all.  When  I  recall  the  very 
different  procedure  of  the  technical  commission  appointed  by  the 
New  Panama  Canal  Company,  which  extended  its  consideration  of 
the  subject  from  February  3,  1896,  to  September  8,  1898,  during  which 
time  ninety-seven  stated  meetings  and  a  large  number  of  informal 
meetings  were  held,  I  say,  it  seems  to  me,  from  a  practical  business 
point  of  view,  casting  no  reflection  upon  either  the  ability  or  the  fair- 
ness of  judgment  of  the  members  of  the  International  Board,  that  the 
mere  element  of  time  should  weigh  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  verdict  of 
the  technical  commission  of  1898,  which  was  unanimous  for  a  lock  canal. 
Of  the  technical  commission  of  1896-1898,  Mr.  Hunter,  chief  engi- 
neer of  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal,  was  a  member,  and  he  at  that 
time,  without  a  word  of  dissent,  joined  the  other  members  in  giving 
the  unanimous  and  emphatic  expression  of  the  committee  in  favor  of 
a  lock  canal. 

Mr.  Teller. — Mr.  President 


The  Vice  President. — Does  the  Senator  from  New  Jersey  yield  to  the 
Senator  from  Colorado? 

Mr.  Dryden. — Certainly. 

Mr.  Teller. — Will  the  Senator  kindly  repeat  the  date  of  that? 

Mr.  Dryden. — Of  the  technical  commission  of  1896-1898,  Mr. 
Hunter,  the  chief  engineer  of  the  Manchester  Canal,  was  a  member. 
The  technical  commission  was  of  the  new  French  company. 

Mr.  Teller. — You  refer  to  the  commission  of  the  new  French  com- 
pany? 

Mr.  Dryden. — Yes,  sir;  the  commission  of  the  new  French  company. 

Why  he  should  now  change  his  views  and  convictions  and  why  he 
should  now  be  so  emphatic  and  pronounced  in  favor  of  a  sea-level 
project  is  not  set  forth  in  anything  that  has  been  printed  or  been  com- 
municated to  the  Senate  Committee  on  Interoceanic  Canals.  This 
hurried  action,  this  scanty  consideration,  as  I  have  stated,  is  the 
foundation  upon  which  the  advocates  of  the  sea-level  plan  rest  their 
appeal  for  support.  This  is  the  report  and  the  evidence  upon  which 
Congress  is  requested  to  pronounce  in  favor  of  a  sea-level  project  and 
give  its  indorsement  to  a  plan  which  will  involve  the  country  in  at 
least  $100,000,000  of  additional  expenditure  and  which  will  delay  the 
opening  of  the  canal  for  practical  purposes  of  navigation  possibly  for 
ten  years  or  more  after  the  lock  canal  can  be  finished  and  opened  for  use. 

The  Isthmian  Commission  restates  certain  points  in  a  clear  and 
precise  way,  which  leaves  no  escape  from  the  conclusion  that  both 
as  to  time  and  cost  the  majority  members  of  the  Board  materially 
underestimated  important  factors,  and  that  they  have  every  reason 

14 


to  believe  that  the  total  estimate  of  cost  of  a  sea-level  canal  should  be 
raised  to  $272,000,000,  and  that  the  estimate  of  time  for  construction 
should  be  increased  to  at  least  fifteen  and  a  half  years.  But  under 
certain  readily  conceivable  conditions  it  is  practically  certain  that  the 
construction  of  a  sea-level  canal  will  consume  not  less  than  twenty 
years. 

The  Isthmian  Commission  reexamined  carefully  the  question  of 
relative  efficiency  of  the  proposed  sea-level  canal  compared  with  a 
lock  canal,  and  they  pronounce  emphatically  and  unequivocally  in 
favor  of  the  lock  project.  They  consider  that  the  assumed  danger 
from  accidents  to  locks  by  passing  vessels  or  otherwise  is  greatly  ex- 
aggerated, and  hold  that  while  no  doubt  accidents  may  occur,  and  pos- 
sibly will  occur,  such  dangers  can  and  will  be  sufficiently  guarded 
against  by  an  effective  method  of  supervision  and  control.  They  hold 
that  a  lock  canal  properly  constructed  and  managed  is  in  no  sense  a 
menace  to  the  safety  of  vessels,  and  that  much  practical  experience  and 
particularly  the  half -century  of  successful  operation  of  the  "Soo" 
Canal  have  demonstrated  the  contrary  beyond  dispute.  They  point 
out  that  the  canal  with  locks  at  a  level  of  eighty-five  feet  will  be  a 
waterway  three  times  the  size,  in  navigable  area,  of  the  projected  sea- 
level  canal,  and,  omitting  the  locks  from  consideration,  will  therefore 
afford  three  times  the  shipping  facilities. 

They  show  that  in  the  sea-level  canal  there  will  be  many  and  serious 
curves,  while  in  the  lock  canal  the  courses  are  straight  and  changes  of 
direction  will  be  made  at  intersecting  tangents,  the  same  as  in  our 
river  navigation,  in  which  serious  accidents  are  practically  unknown. 
They  show  that  the  courses  in  a  lock  canal  can  be  marked  with  ranges 
which  will  greatly  facilitate  navigation,  particularly  at  night.  The 
Commission  points  out  that  the  argument  of  the  majority  of  the  Board, 
that  locks  will  limit  the  traffic  capacity  of  the  canal,  carries  very  little 
if  any  weight,  and  they  refer  to  the  experience  of  the  "Soo"  Canal, 
through  which  there  passes  annually  a  larger  traffic  than  through 
all  the  other  ship  canals  of  the  world  combined. 

Finally,  the  Isthmian  Commission  discusses  the  cost  of  operation 
and  maintenance.  The  majority  of  the  Board  submit  no  details  upon 
this  most  important  item  in  canal  construction  and  subsequent 
operation.  What  banking  house  in  the  world  would  advance  a  single 
dollar  upon  a  canal  or  railway  project  upon  a  mere  statement  of  the 
probable  ultimate  cost,  but  with  no  corresponding  information  as  to 
cost  of  maintenance  and  operation!  Having  been  appointed  to  re- 
examine into  all  the  facts,  and,  so  to  speak,  to  reconsider  the  entire 
project,  the  majority  seriously  erred  in  omitting  from  their  report  the 
necessary  data  and  calculations  for  an  accurate  and  trustworthy  esti- 
mate of  the  cost  of  operation  and  maintenance  of  a  sea-level  canal. 

From  this  point  of  view  and  in  the  light  of  the  facts  as  presented  by 

15 


the  Board  for  or  against  either  project,  the  Isthmian  Commission 
could  not  consistently  act  otherwise  than  to  give  their  final  approval 
to  the  more  specific  and  practical  recommendations  of  the  minority 
members  of  the  Board,  and  they  properly  say  that  '*U  appears  that  the 
canal  proposed  by  the  minority  of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers 
can  be  built  in  half  the  time  and  for  a  little  more  than  half  of  the  cost  of 
the  canal  proposed  by  the  majority  of  the  Board.''  They  advance  a 
number  of  specific  reasons  why  a  lock  canal  when  completed  will  for  all 
practical  purposes — commercial,  military,  and  naval — be  a  better 
canal  than  a  sea-level  waterway  with  a  tidal  lock,  as  proposed  by  the 
majority  members  of  the  Board. 

The  report  of  the  Board  was  carefully  and  critically  examined  by 
Chief  Engineer  Stevens,  of  the  Isthmian  Commission  and  in  actual 
charge  of  engineering  matters  on  the  Isthmus.  Mr.  Stevens  is  a  man 
of  very  large  practical  American  engineering  experience,  and  he  adds 
to  the  finding  of  the  Commission  the  weight  of  his  authority,  decidedly 
and  unequivocally  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal.  He  states  as  the  sum  of 
his  conclusions  that,  all  things  considered,  the  lock  or  high-level  canal 
is  preferable  to  the  sea-level  type,  so-called,  for  the  reason  that  it  will 
provide  a  safer  and  quicker  passage  for  ships;  that  it  will  provide 
beyond  question  the  best  solution  of  the  vital  problem  of  how  safely 
to  care  for  the  flood  waters  of  the  Chagres  and  other  streams ;  that  pro- 
vision is  ojffered  in  the  lock  project  for  enlarging  its  capacity  to  almost 
any  extent  at  very  much  less  expense  of  time  and  money  than  can  be 
provided  for  by  any  sea-level  plan;  that  its  cost  of  operation,  main- 
tenance, and  fixed  charges,  including  interest,  will  be  very  much  less 
than  any  sea-level  canal,  and  that  the  time  and  cost  of  its  construction 
will  not  be  more  than  one-half  that  of  a  canal  of  the  sea-level  type; 
that  the  lock  project  will  permit  of  navigation  by  night;  and  that, 
finally,  even  at  the  same  cost  in  time  and  money,  Mr.  Stevens  would 
favor  the  adoption  of  the  high-level  lock  canal  plan  in  preference  to 
that  of  the  proposed  sea-level  canal. 

To  these  observations  and  comments  the  Secretary  of  War,  under 
whose  supervision  this  great  w^ork  is  going  on,  adds  his  opinion,  which  is 
decidedly  and  unequivocally  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal.  In  his  letter  to 
the  President,  Mr.  Taft  goes  into  all  the  important  details  of  the 
subject  and  reveals  a  masterly  grasp  of  the  situation  as  it  confronts  the 
American  people  at  the  present  time.  He  calls  attention  to  the  fact 
that  lock  navigation  is  not  an  experiment;  that  all  the  locks  in  the 
proposed  canal  are  duplicated,  thereby  minimizing  such  dangers  as 
are  inherent  in  any  canal  project,  and  he  adds  that  experience  shows 
that  with  proper  plans  and  regulations  the  dangers  are  much  more 
imaginary  than  real.  He  goes  into  the  facts  of  the  proposed  great  dam 
to  be  constructed  at  Gatun  and  points  out  that  such  construction  is 
not  experimental,  but  sustained  by  large  American  experience,  which 

16 


is  larger,  perhaps,  than  that  of  any  other  country  in  the  world.  He 
gives  his  indorsement  to  the  views  of  the  Isthmian  Commission  and  its 
chief  engineer  that  the  estimated  cost  of  time  and  money  for  completing 
a  sea-level  canal  is  not  correctly  stated  by  the  majority  members  of  the 
Board,  and  that  the  cost,  in  all  probability,  will  be  at  least  $25,000,000 
more,  while,  in  his  opinion,  eighteen  to  twenty  years  will  be  necessary 
to  complete  the  sea-level  project.  He  also  holds  that  the  military 
advantages  will  be  decidedly  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal. 

This  is  practically  the  present  status  of  facts  and  opinions  regarding 
the  canal  problem  as  it  is  now  before  Congress,  except  that  since  Janu- 
ary the  Senate  Committee  on  Interoceanic  Canals  has  collected  a  large 
mass  of  additional  and  valuable  testimony.  Restating  the  facts  in  a 
somewhat  different  way.  Congress  is  asked  to  give  its  final  approval 
to  the  sea-level  proposition,  chiefly  favored  by  foreigners,  and  to  give  its 
disapproval  to  the  project  of  a  lock  canal,  favored  by  American  engi- 
neers. Congress  is  asked  to  rely  in  the  main  upon  the  experience 
gained  in  the  management  of  the  Suez  Canal,  where  the  conditions  are 
essentially  and  fundamentally  different  from  what  they  are  or  ever  will 
be  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  to  disregard  the  more  than  fifty 
years'  experience  in  the  successful  management  of  the  lock  canals 
connecting  the  Great  Lakes.  Congress  is  asked  to  pronounce  against 
the  lock  canal  because  in  the  management  of  the  ship  canal  at  Man- 
chester several  accidents  have  occurred,  due  to  carelessness  or  ignorance 
in  navigation,  and  we  are  asked  to  disregard  the  successful  record  of  the 
"Soo"  Canal,  in  the  management  of  which  only  three  accidents,  of  no 
very  serious  importance,  have  occurred  during  more  than  fifty  years. 

In  no  other  country  in  the  world  has  there  been  more  experience 
with  lock  canals  than  in  this.  For  nearly  a  hundred  years  the  Erie 
Canal  has  been  one  of  our  most  successful  of  inland  waterways,  con- 
necting the  ocean  with  the  Great  Lakes.  The  Erie  Canal  is  387  miles 
in  length,  has  72  locks,  and  is  now  being  enlarged,  to  accommodate 
barges  of  a  thousand  tons,  at  a  cost  of  $101,000,000.  We  have  the 
Ohio  Canal,  with  150  locks;  the  Miami  and  Erie  Canal,  with  93  locks; 
the  Pennsylvania  Canal,  with  71  locks;  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio 
Canal,  with  73  locks;  and  numerous  other  inland  waterways  of  lesser 
importance.  It  is  a  question  of  degree  and  not  of  kind,  for  the  problem 
is  the  same  in  all  essentials,  and  confronts  Congress  as  much  in  the 
proposed  deep  waterway  connecting  tide-water  with  the  Great  Lakes, 
in  which  locks  are  proposed  with  a  lift  of  40  feet  or  more,  or  very 
considerably  in' excess  of  the  proposed  lift  of  the  locks  on  the  Isthmian 
Canal. 

The  proposed  ship  canal  from  Lake  Erie  to  the  Ohio  River  provides 
for  34  locks.  The  suggested  canal  from  Lake  Michigan  to  the  Illinois 
and  Mississippi  rivers  provides  for  37  locks,  and,  finally,  the  projected 
ship  canal  from  the  St.  Lawrence  River  to  Lake  Huron  contemplates  22 

17 


locks.  So  that  lock  canals  of  exceptional  magnitude  are  not  only  in 
existence,  but  new  canals  of  this  type  are  contemplated  in  the  United 
States  and  Canada. 

In  other  words,  Congress  is  asked  to  regard  with  preference  the 
judgment  and  opinions  of  foreign  engineers  and  to  disregard  the  judg- 
ment and  opinions  of  American  engineers.  We  are  seriously  asked  to 
completely  disregard  American  opinion,  as  voiced  by  the  Isthmian 
Commission,  responsible  for  the  enterprise  as  a  whole ;  as  voiced  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  responsible  for  the  time  being  for  the  proper  execu- 
tion of  the  work;  as  voiced  by  Chief  Engineer  Stevens,  who  stands 
foremost  among  Americans  in  his  profession ;  and  finally,  as  voiced  by 
all  the  engineers  now  on  the  Isthmus,  who  have  a  practical  knowledge 
of  the  actual  conditions,  and  who  are  as  thoroughly  familiar  as  any 
class  of  men  with  the  problems  which  confront  us  and  with  the  con- 
ditions which  will  have  to  be  met.  I  for  one,  leaving  out  of  considera- 
tion for  the  present  details  which  are  subject  to  modification  and 
change,  believe  that  it  will  be  a  fatal  error  for  the  nation  to  commit 
itself  to  the  practically  hopeless  and  visionary  sea-level  project  and  to 
delay  for  many  years  the  opening  of  this  much  needed  waterway 
connecting  the  Atlantic  with  the  Pacific.  I  for  one  am  opposed  to  a 
waste  of  untold  millions  and  to  additional  burdens  of  needless  taxation, 
while  the  project  of  a  lock  canal  offers  every  practical  advantage,  offers 
a  canal  within  a  reasonable  period  of  time  and  at  a  reasonable  cost, 
offers  a  waterway  of  enormous  advantage  to  American  shipping,  of  the 
greatest  possible  value  to  the  nation  in  the  event  of  war,  and  the 
opportunity  for  the  American  people  to  carry  into  execution  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment  what  has  been  called  the  "dream  of  naviga- 
tors," and  what  has  thus  far  defied  the  engineering  skill  of  European 
nations. 

But  in  addition  to  the  evidence  presented  for  or  against  a  sea-level 
or  lock  canal  project  by  the  two  conflicting  reports  of  the  Board  of 
Consulting  Engineers,  there  is  now  available  a  very  considerable  mass 
of  testimony  of  American  engineers  who  were  called  as  witnesses  before 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Interoceanic  Canals.  The  testimony  has 
been  printed  as  a  separate  document  and  makes  a  volume  of  nearly  a 
thousand  pages.  Much  of  this  evidence  is  conflicting,  much  of  it  is 
mere  engineering  opinion,  much  of  it  comes  perilously  near  to  being 
engineering  guesswork,  but  a  large  part  of  it  is  of  practical  value  and 
may  safely  be  relied  upon  to  guide  the  Congress  in  an  effort  to  arrive 
at  a  final  and  correct  conclusion  respecting  the  type  of  canal  best 
adapted  to  our  needs  and  requirements. 

A  critical  examination  and  review  of  this  testimony,  as  presented  to 
the  Senate  Committee  from  day  to  day  for  nearly  five  months,  including 
the  testimony  of  administrative  officers  and  others,  relating  to  Panama 
Canal  affairs  generally,  is  not  practicable  at  this  stage  of  the  session. 

18 


Among  others,  the  committee  examined  Mr.  John  F.  Stevens,  chief 
engineer,  upon  all  the  essential  points  in  controversy,  regarding  which, 
in  the  light  of  additional  experience  and  a  very  considerable  amount  of 
new  and  more  exact  information,  Mr.  Stevens  reajSirms  his  convictions 
in  favor  of  the  practicability  and  superior  advantages  of  a  lock  canal. 

In  opposition  to  the  views  and  conclusions  of  Mr.  Stevens,  Prof. 
William  H.  Burr  pronounced  himself  emphatically  in  favor  of  the  sea- 
level  project.  As  a  member  of  the  former  Isthmian  Commission,  re- 
porting upon  the  type  of  canal,  Mr.  Burr  had  signed  the  report  in 
favor  of  the  lock  project,  but  as  a  member  of  the  Board  of  Consulting 
Engineers  he  had  sided  with  the  majority  favoring  the  sea-level  canal. 
Thus  engineering  opinion  is  as  apt  as  any  other  human  opinion  to 
undergo  a  change,  and  the  convictions  of  one  year  in  favor  of  a  propo- 
sition may  change  into  opposite  convictions,  favoring  an  opposite 
proposition,  only  a  few  years  later.  Mr.  William  Barclay  Parsons, 
also  a  member  of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers,  who  had  signed 
the  report  in  favor  of  the  sea-level  project,  gave  further  evidence  be- 
fore the  committee,  restating  his  views  and  convictions  in  favor  of 
the  sea-level  type.  Mr.  William  Noble,  an  engineer  of  large  experi- 
ence, for  some  years  in  charge  of  the  "Soo"  Canal,  and  who,  as  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers,  had  signed  the  report  in 
favor  of  a  lock  project,  restates  his  views  and  convictions  in  favor  of  a 
lock  canal.  Mr.  Noble  had  also  been  a  member  of  the  Isthmian 
Commission  of  1902,  reporting  at  that  time  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal. 

Mr.  Frederick  P.  Stearns,  the  foremost  American  authority  on  earth- 
dam  construction,  gave  evidence  regarding  the  safety  of  the  proposed 
dams  at  Gatun  and  other  points.  His  views  and  conclusions  are  based 
upon  large  practical  experience  and  a  profound  theoretical  knowledge 
of  the  subject.  Mr.  Stearns  had  also  been  a  member  of  the  Consult- 
ing Board  of  Engineers  and  as  such  had  signed  the  report  of  the 
minority  in  favor  of  the  lock  project.  He  reaffirmed  his  views  favoring 
a  lock  canal  with  a  dam  at  Gatun.  Mr.  John  F.  Wallace,  former 
chief  engineer,  gave  testimony  in  favor  of  the  sea-level  type  and  strongly 
opposed  the  lock  project.  Col.  Oswald  H.  Ernst,  United  States  Army, 
than  whom  probably  few  are  more  thoroughly  familiar  with  condi- 
tions on  the  Isthmus  and  the  entire  project  of  canal  construction, 
declared  himself  to  be  strongly  in  favor  of  the  lock-canal  project. 

Gen.  Peter  C.  Hains,  United  States  Army,  equally  well  qualified  to 
express  an  opinion  on  the  subject  in  all  its  important  points,  pro- 
nounced himself  strongly  and  unequivocally  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal. 

Gen.  Henry  L.  Abbot,  United  States  Army,  one  of  the  highest 
authorities  on  river  hydraulics,  thoroughly  familiar  with  Mississippi 
River  flood  problems,  a  former  member  of  the  International  Technical 
Commission,  of  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company,  and  for  a  time  its 
consulting  engineer,  a  member  of  different  Isthmian  commissions,  and 

19 


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also  a  member  of  the  consulting  board,  reemphasized  his  conviction, 
sustained  by  much  valuable  evidence,  in  favor  of  the  lock -canal  project. 
General  Abbot,  as  a  member  of  the  consulting  board,  had  signed  the 
report  of  the  minority  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal.  Gen.  George  W. 
Davis,  United  States  Army,  for  a  time  governor  of  the  Canal  Zone  and 
president  of  the  International  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers,  restated 
his  views  and  convictions  as  opposed  to  the  lock-canal  type  and  in 
favor  of  the  sea-level  project.  The  last  witness,  Mr.  B.  M.  Harrod, 
an  engineer  of  large  experience,  for  many  years  connected  with  levee 
construction  and  familiar  with  the  flood  problems  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  submitted  a  statement  in  which  he  restated  his  views  in  favor  of 
a  lock  canal. 

So  that,  summing  up  the  evidence  of  twelve  engineers  examined 
before  the  committee  (including  Mr.  Lindon  W.  Bates),  there  were 
eight  American  engineers  strongly  and  unequivocally  in  favor  of  a 
lock  canal,  while  four  expressed  their  views  to  the  contrary.  Subject- 
ing the  mass  of  testimony  to  a  critical  examination,  I  cannot  draw  any 
other  conclusion  or  arrive  at  any  other  conviction  than  that  the  lock 
project,  in  the  light  of  the  facts  and  large  experience,  has  decidedly  the 
advantage  over  the  sea-level  proposition.  And  this  view  is  strengthened 
by  the  fact  that  the  opinion  of  the  engineers  most  competent  to  judge — 
that  is,  men  like  Mr.  Noble,  who  has  thoroughly  studied  lock-canal 
construction,  management,  and  navigation,  who  as  a  member  of  the 
United  States  Deep  Waterway  Commission  reexamined  probably  as 
thoroughly  as  any  living  authority  into  the  entire  subject  of  the  me- 
chanics and  practice  of  lock  canals — is  emphatically  opposed  to  the 
sea-level  proposition. 

When  a  man  like  Mr.  Stearns,  of  national  and  international  reputa- 
tion as  a  waterworks  engineer,  who  for  many  years  has  been  in  charge 
of  the  extensive  construction  work  of  the  Massachusetts  Metropolitan 
Water  and  Sewerage  Board,  and  who  probably  has  as  large  a  practical 
and  theoretical  knowledge  of  earth-dam  construction  as  any  living 
authority,  declares  himself  to  be  strongly  in  favor  of  the  lock  project 
and  believes  in  the  entire  safety  of  the  dams  required  in  connection 
therewith,  I  hold  that  such  a  judgment  may  be  relied  upon  and  that  it 
should  govern  in  national  affairs  as  it  would  govern  in  private  affairs 
if  the  canal  construction  were  a  business  enterprise  and  involved  the 
risk  of  private  capital.  When  we  find  a  man  like  Mr.  Harrod,  who  for 
many  years  has  been  in  charge  of  levee  construction  in  Louisiana, 
thoroughly  familiar  with  the  theory  and  practice  of  river  and  flood 
control,  express  himself  in  favor  of  the  lock  project  and  in  opposition 
to  the  sea-level  canal,  I  hold  that  we  may  with  entire  confidence  accept 
his  judgment  as  a  governing  principle  in  arriving  at  a  final  decision 
respecting  the  type  of  the  canal  to  be  finally  fixed  by  the  Congress. 

And,  going  back  to  the  minority  report  of  the  Board  of  Consulting 

22 


Engineers,  we  find  that  Mr.  Joseph  Ripley,  the  general  superintendent 
at  present  in  charge  of  the  "Soo"  Canal,  and  Mr.  Isham  Randolph, 
chief  engineer  of  the  sanitary  district  of  Chicago,  and  thoroughly 
familiar  with  canal  construction  and  management,  both  American 
engineers  of  much  experience  and  high  standing,  pronounce  themselves 
in  favor  of  a  lock  canal.  When  confronted  by  these  facts,  I  for  one 
would  rely  upon  American  engineers,  American  conviction  and  Amer- 
ican experience,  and  accept  the  lock-canal  proposition. 

In  this  matter,  as  in  all  other  practical  problems,  we  may  safely 
take  the  business  point  of  view,  and  calculate  without  bias  or  prejudice 
the  respective  advantages  and  disadvantages;  and  the  more  thorough 
the  method  of  reasoning  and  logic  applied  to  the  canal  problem  the 
more  emphatic  and  incontrovertible  the  conclusion  that  the  Congress 
should  decide  in  favor  of  a  plan  which  will  give  us  a  navigable  water- 
way across  the  Isthmus  within  a  measurable  distance  of  time  and 
with  a  reasonable  expenditure  of  money,  as  opposed  to  a  visionary 
theory  of  an  ideal  canal  which  may  ultimately  be  constructed,  possibly 
for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  future  generations,  but  at  an  enormous 
waste  of  money,  time,  and  opportunity.  I  do  not  think  we  want  to 
repeat  at  this  late  stage  of  the  canal  problem  the  fatal  error  of  De  Les- 
seps,  who,  when  he  had  the  opportunity  in  1879  to  make  a  choice  of  a 
practical  waterway,  being  influenced  by  his  great  success  at  Suez, 
upon  the  most  fragmentary  evidence  and  in  the  absence  of  definite 
knowledge  of  actual  conditions,  decided  beforehand  in  favor  of  a  sea- 
level  canal.  It  was  largely  his  bias  and  prejudice  which  proved  fatal 
to  the  enterprise  and  to  himself. 

I  may  recall  that  the  so-called  "international  congress  of  1879"  was 
a  mere  subterfuge;  that  the  opinions  of  eminent  engineers,  including 
all  the  Americans,  were  opposed  to  a  sea-level  project  and  in  favor  of 
a  lock  canal,  but  De  Lesseps  had  made  his  plans,  he  had  arrived  at  his 
decision,  and  in  his  own  words,  at  a  meeting  of  the  American  Society 
of  Civil  Engineers  held  in  January,  1880,  said,  "I  would  have  put  my 
hat  on  and  walked  out  if  any  other  plan  than  a  sea-level  canal  project 
had  been  adopted." 

The  situation  to-day  is  very  similar  to  the  critical  state  of  the  canal 
question  in  1902.  What  was  then  a  question  of  choice  of  route  is  to- 
day a  question  of  choice  of  plan.  What  was  then  a  geographical  con- 
flict is  to-day  a  conflict  of  engineering  opinions.  It  has  been  made 
clear  by  the  reference  to  the  report  of  the  Board  of  Consulting  En- 
gineers and  by  the  testimony  of  the  engineers  before  the  Senate  com- 
mittee that  the  opinion  of  eminent  experts  is  so  widely  at  variance 
that  there  is  little,  if  any,  hope  of  an  ultimate  reconciliation.  It  is  a 
choice  of  one  plan  or  the  other — of  a  sea-level  or  a  lock  canal.  In 
respect  to  either  plan  a  mass  of  testimony  and  data  exists,  which  has 
been  brought  forward  to  sustain  one  view  or  the  other.      In  respect 

23 


to  either  plan  there  are  advantages  and  disadvantages.  The  majority 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Interoceanic  Canals  have  reported  favor- 
ably a  bill  providing  for  the  construction  of  a  canal  at  sea  level.  From 
this  majority  opinion  the  minority  of  the  committee  emphatically 
and  unequivocally  dissent,  and  in  their  report  they  express  themselves 
in  favor  of  the  lock  canal. 

The  minority  report  calls  attention  to  the  changed  conditions  and 
requirements,  which  now  demand  a  canal  of  much  larger  dimensions 
than  originally  proposed.  Even  as  late  as  1901  the  depth  of  the  canal 
prism  was  to  be  only  35  feet,  against  40  to  45  feet  in  the  project  of  only 
five  years  later.  The  bottom  width  has  been  increased  from  150  to 
200  feet  and  over.  The  length  of  the  locks  has  been  changed  from 
740  to  900  feet,  and  the  width  from  84  to  90  feet.  These  facts  must 
be  kept  in  mind,  for  they  bear  upon  the  questions  of  time  and  cost, 
and  a  sea-level  or  lock  canal,  as  proposed  to-day,  is  in  all  respects  a 
very  much  larger  affair,  demanding  very  superior  facilities  for  traffic, 
than  any  previous  canal  project  ever  suggested  or  proposed.  This 
change  in  plans  was  made  necessary  by  the  Spooner  act,  which  pro- 
vides for  a  canal  of  such  dimensions  that  the  largest  ship  now  building, 
or  likely  to  be  built  within  a  reasonable  period  of  time,  can  be  accom- 
modated. 

Now,  the  estimated  saving  in  money  alone  by  adopting  the  lock 
plan — that  is,  on  the  original  investment,  to  say  nothing  of  accumulat- 
ing interest  charges — would  be  at  least  $100,000,000.  Granting  all 
that  is  said  in  favor  of  a  sea-level  canal,  it  is  not  apparent  by  any 
evidence  produced  that  such  a  canal  would  prove  a  material  advantage 
over  a  lock  canal.  All  its  assumed  advantages  are  entirely  offset  by  the 
vastly  greater  cost  and  longer  period  of  time  necessary  for  construction, 
and  I  am  confident  that  they  would  not  be  considered  for  a  moment  if 
the  canal  were  built  as  a  commercial  enterprise.  I  do  not  think  that 
they  should  hold  good  where  the  canal  is  the  work  of  the  nation,  be- 
cause a  vast  sum  of  money  otherwise  needed  will  be  eventually  sunk  if 
the  sea-level  project  is  adopted,  and  entirely  upon  the  theory  that  if 
certain  conditions  should  arise  then  it  would  be  better  to  have  a  sea- 
level  than  a  lock  canal.  We  have  never  before  proceeded  in  national 
undertakings  upon  such  an  assumption;  we  have  never  before,  as  far 
as  I  know,  deliberately  disregarded  every  principle  of  economy  in 
money  and  time;  we  have  never  before  in  national  projects  attempted 
to  conform  to  merely  theoretical  ideas,  but  we  have  always  adhered  to 
practical,  hard  common-sense  notions  of  what  is  best  under  the  circum- 
stances. 

The  majority  of  the  committee  attack  the  proposition  that  the 
proposed  lock  canal  will  have  "locks  with  dimensions  far  exceeding  any 
that  have  ever  been  made."  If  this  principle  were  adopted  in  every 
other  line  of  human  effort  all  advancement  would  come  to  an  end — 

24 


even  the  canal  enterprise  itself — for,  as  it  stands  to-day,  it  far  exceeds 
in  magnitude  any  corresponding  effort  ever  made  by  this  or  any  other 
nation.  They  say  that  the  proposed  flight  of  three  locks  at  Gatun 
would  be  objectionable  and  unsafe,  but  we  have  the  evidence  of  Ameri- 
can engineers  of  the  highest  standing,  whose  reputations  are  at  stake, 
who  are  absolutely  confident  that  these  locks  can  be  constructed  and 
operated  with  entire  safety.  The  committee  say  that  "the  entry 
through  and  exit  from  these  contiguous  locks  is  attended  with  very 
great  danger  to  the  lock  gates  and  to  the  ships  as  well";  but  if  mere 
inherent  danger  of  possible  accidents  were  an  objection  there  would  be 
no  great  steamships,  no  great  battleships,  no  great  bridges  and  tunnels, 
no  great  undertakings  of  any  kind. 

The  committee  point  out  that  accidents  have  occurred  in  the 
"Soo"  Canal  and  in  the  Manchester  Ship  Canal;  but  the  conditions, 
in  the  first  place,  were  decidedly  different,  and,  in  the  second  place, 
they  proved  of  no  serious  consequence  as  a  hindrance  to  traffic  and  did 
no  material  injury  to  the  canal.  The  "Soo"  Canal  has  been  in  opera- 
tion as  a  lock  canal  for  some  fifty  years ;  it  has  been  enlarged  from  time 
to  time,  and  to-day  accommodates  a  larger  traffic  than  passes  through 
all  other  ship  canals  of  the  world  combined.  It  is  a  sufficient  answer 
to  the  objections  to  say  that  this  experience  should  have  a  determining 
influence  in  arriving  at  a  conclusion,  for  the  inherent  problems  of  lock- 
canal  construction  are  as  well  understood  by  American  engineers  as 
any  other  problems  or  questions  in  engineering  science.  The  pro- 
posed deep  waterway  with  a  30-foot  channel  from  Chicago  to  tide- 
water, which  has  been  surveyed  by  direction  of  Congress,  proposes  an 
expenditure  of  $303,000,000,  and  several  locks  with  a  lift  of  40  feet  or 
more.  The  enlargement  of  the  Erie  Canal  by  the  State  of  New  York, 
at  an  expenditure  of  $101,000,000,  involves  engineering  problems, 
including  lock  construction,  not  essentially  different  from  those  in- 
herent in  the  lock-canal  project  at  Panama;  and  if  these  problems 
can  be  solved  by  our  engineers  at  home,  it  stands  to  reason  that  we 
may  rely  upon  their  judgment  that  they  can  be  solved  at  Panama. 

The  majority  of  the  Senate  committee  object  to  the  proposed  dam 
at  Gatun,  and  say  that — 

Earth  dams  founded  on  the  drift  and  silt  of  ages,  through  which  water  habitually 
percolates,  to  be  increased  by  the  pressure  of  the  8  5 -foot  lock  when  made,  have  been 
referred  to  by  many  of  our  technical  advisers  as  another  element  of  danger.  The 
vast  masses  of  earth  piled  on  this  alluvial  base  to  the  height  of  135  feet  will  certainly 
settle,  and  as  the  drift  material  of  this  base  or  foundation  has  varying  depth,  to  250 
feet  or  more,  the  settlement  of  the  new  mass,  as  well  as  its  base,  will  be  unequal,  and 
it  is  predicted  that  cracks  and  fissures  in  the  dam  will  be  formed,  which  will  be  reached 
and  used  by  the  water  under  the  presstu-e  above  mentioned,  and  will  cause  the  de- 
struction of  the  dam  and  the  draining  off  of  the  great  lake  upon  which  the  integrity  of 
the  entire  canal  rests. 

But  all  of  this  is  mere  conjecture.     The  evidence  of  Engineer 

25 


Stearns,  a  man  of  large  experience,  and  of  Engineer  Harrod,  familiar 
with  river  hydraulics  and  levee  construction,  and  of  many  others,  is 
emphatically  to  the  contrary.  There  is  not  an  American  engineer  of 
ability,  nor  an  American  contractor  of  experience,  who  would  not 
undertake  to  build  the  proposed  dam  at  Gatun  and  guarantee  its  safety 
and  permanency  without  any  hesitation  whatever.  The  alternative 
proposal  of  a  dam  at  Gamboa  would  be  as  objectionable  upon  much 
the  same  ground,  and  the  dam  there,  which  is  indispensable  to  the  sea- 
level  project,  has  also  been  considered  unsafe  by  some  of  the  engineers. 
In  all  questions  of  this  kind  the  aggregate  experience  of  mankind  ought 
to  have  greater  weight  than  the  abstract  theories  of  individuals,  and  I 
am  confident  that  our  engineers,  who  have  so  successfully  solved 
problems  of  the  greatest  magnitude  in  the  reclamation  projects  of  the 
far  West  and  in  the  control  and  regulation  of  the  floods  of  the  Missis- 
sippi River,  will  solve  with  equal  success  similar  problems  at  Panama. 

The  committee  further  says  that  the  sea-level  project  contemplates 
the  removal  of  some  110,000,000  cubic  yards  of  material,  while  the 
lock  canal  would  require  the  removal  of  only  about  half  that  quantity, 
or,  in  other  words,  that  there  is  a  difference  of  some  57,000,000  cubic 
yards,  which,  "to  omit  to  take  out  .  .  .  is  to  confess  our  im- 
potence, which  is  not  characteristic  of  the  American  people  or  their 
engineers  or  contractors."  By  this  method  of  reasoning  a  nation 
which  can  build  a  battleship  of  16,000  tons  displacement  is  impotent 
if  it  can  not  build  one  of  twice  that  tonnage,  and  if  this  reason  applies  to 
quantity  of  material,  why  not  say  that  a  nation  which  can  dig  a  canal 
150  feet  wide  through  a  mountain  some  seven  miles  in  length  admits 
its  impotence  if  it  can  not  dig  one  300  feet  wide,  or  600  feet,  if  it  should 
please  to  do  so?  But  why  should  it  be  less  difficult  or  a  declaration 
of  impotency  on  the  part  of  our  engineers  to  build  a  safe  lock  canal 
including  a  satisfactory  and  safe  controlling  dam  at  Gatun?  As  I 
conceive  the  problem,  it  is  one  of  reasonable  compromise,  and  while  I 
do  not  question  the  ability  of  American  engineers  and  contractors  to 
build  a  sea-level  canal,  I  am  convinced  by  the  facts  in  evidence  that 
they  can  not  do  it  within  the  time  and  for  the  money  assumed  by  the 
advocates  of  the  sea-level  project. 

This  question  of  time  is  of  supreme  importance.  Ten  years  in  a 
nation's  life  is  often  a  long  space  in  national  history.  Many  times  the 
map  of  the  world  has  been  changed  in  less  than  a  decade.  No  man  in 
1890  anticipated  the  war  with  Spain  in  1898,  and  no  man  in  1906  can 
say  what  important  event  may  not  happen  before  the  next  decade  has 
passed.  The  progress  during  peace  is  far  greater  in  its  permanent 
effect  than  the  changes  brought  about  by  war.  The  world's  commerce, 
the  social,  commercial,  and  political  development  of  the  South  Ameri- 
can republics  and  of  Asiatic  nations,  all  depend,  more  or  less,  upon  the 
completion  of  an  Isthmian  waterway.     It  is  the  duty  of  this  nation, 

26 


since  we  have  assumed  this  task,  to  construct  a  waterway  across  the 
Isthmus  within  the  shortest  reasonable  period  of  time.  Valuable 
years  have  passed,  valuable  opportunities  have  gone  by.  In  1884  De 
Lesseps,  with  supreme  confidence  and  upon  the  judgment  of  his  engi- 
neers, anticipated  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal  in  1 888.  That  was 
nearly  twenty  years  ago.  Shall  it  be  twenty  years  more  before  that 
greatest  event  in  the  world's  commercial  history  takes  place?  Had 
De  Lesseps  in  1879  gone  before  the  International  Congress  with  a 
proposition  for  a  feasible  canal  at  reasonable  cost,  free  from  prejudice 
or  bias,  had  he  then  adopted  the  American  suggestion  for  a  lock  canal, 
he  would  probably  have  lived  to  see  its  completion,  and  the  world  for 
fifteen  years  would  have  had  the  use  of  a  practical  waterway  across 
the  Isthmus. 

As  to  safety  in  operation,  which  the  committee  discuss  in  their  report, 
there  is  one  very  important  point  to  be  kept  in  mind,  and  that  is  that 
nine-tenths,  or  possibly  a  larger  proportion,  of  shipping  will  be  of 
vessels  of  relatively  small  size.  If  this  should  be  the  case,  then  the 
sea-level  project  contemplates  a  canal  chiefly  designed  to  meet  the 
possible  needs  of  a  very  small  number  of  vessels  of  largest  size,  while 
the  lock  canal  provides  primarily  for  the  accommodation  of  the  class  of 
steamships  which  of  necessity  would  make  the  largest  practical  use  of 
the  Isthmian  waterway.  Now,  it  stands  to  reason  that  special  pre- 
cautions would  be  employed  during  the  passage  of  a  very  large  vessel, 
either  merchantman  or  man-of-war,  and  even  if  necessity  should  de- 
mand the  rapid  passage  of  a  fleet  of  vessels,  say  twenty  or  thirty,  it  is 
not  conceivable  that  a  condition  would  arise  which  could  not  be 
efficiently  safeguarded  against  by  those  in  actual  charge  and  responsible 
for  safety  in  the  management  of  the  canal.  Considering  the  immense 
tonnage  passing  through  the  "Soo"  Canal,  which  would  not  be  equaled 
in  the  Panama  Canal  for  a  century  to  come,  the  very  few  and  relatively 
unimportant  accidents  which  have  occurred  during  the  fifty  years  of 
operation  of  that  waterway  are  in  every  respect  the  most  suggestive 
indorsement  of  the  lock-canal  project  which  could  be  advanced. 

The  time  of  transit,  in  the  opinion  of  the  majority  committee  of  the 
Senate,  would  be  somewhat  longer  in  the  case  of  a  lock  canal.  This 
may  be  so,  though  much  depends  upon  the  class  of  ships  passing 
through  and  their  number.  To  the  practical  navigator  the  loss  of  a 
few  hours  would  be  a  negligible  quantity  compared  with  the  higher 
tolls  that  will  necessarily  be  charged  if  an  additional  $100,000,000  is 
expended  in  construction  and  an  additional  interest  burden  of  at  least 
$2,000,000  per  annum  has  to  be  provided  for.  I  understand  that  the 
actual  value  of  an  hour  or  two  in  the  case  of  commercial  ships  of  average 
size  would  be  a  matter  of  comparatively  no  importance  in  contrast 
with  the  all-suggestive  fact  that  the  alternative  project  of  a  sea-level 
canal  would  provide  no  navigation  whatever  across  the  Isthmus  for 

27 


probably  ten  years  more.  If  it  is  an  advantage  to  gain  an  hour  or  two 
in  transit  ten  years  hence  by  having  no  transisthmian  shipping  facilities 
for  the  ten  years  in  the  meantime,  then  it  might  as  well  be  argued  that 
it  would  be  better  to  project  a  sea-level  canal  300  feet  wide  at  every 
point,  so  that  the  commerce  of  the  year  2000  may  be  properly  pro- 
vided for.  But  to  the  practical  navigator  of  the  year  1916,  who  leaves 
the  port  of  New  York  for  San  Francisco  by  way  of  Cape  Horn,  a 
possible  loss  of  two  or  three  hours  or  more  would  be  many  times 
preferable,  if  the  Isthmus  were  open  for  traffic,  to  a  certain  loss  of 
from  forty  to  fifty  days  to  make  the  voyage  all  around  South  America. 

Upon  the  question  of  cost  of  maintenance  the  majority  committee 
in  their  report  point  out  that  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  did 
not  submit  the  details  of  any  estimate  of  cost  of  maintenance,  repairs, 
etc.,  but  they  say  that  this  factor  was  properly  taken  into  account  by 
the  minority  favoring  a  lock  canal.  Now,  there  is  probably  no  more 
important  question  connected  with  the  whole  canal  problem  than  this, 
for  if  the  annual  expense  of  maintenance,  to  be  provided  for  by  Con- 
gressional appropriations,  should  attain  such  an  exorbitant  figure  as 
to  make  any  fair  return  upon  the  investment  impossible,  it  is  con- 
ceivable that  the  most  serious  political  and  financial  consequences 
might  arise  and  the  success  of  the  enterprise  itself  might  be  placed  in 
jeopardy.  Upon  a  maximum  cost,  in  round  figures,  of  $200,000,000 
for  a  lock  canal,  and  of  $300,000,000  as  a  minimum  for  a  sea-level 
canal,  the  additional  annual  interest  charge  would  be  at  least 
$2,000,000. 

But  Mr.  Stearns  estimates  that  under  certain  conditions  a  sea-level 
canal  might  cost  as  much  as  $410,000,000,  which  would  add  millions  of 
dollars  more  per  annum  to  the  fixed  charges  which  must  be  included  in 
the  cost  of  maintenance,  to  say  nothing  of  a  possibly  much  higher  cost 
of  operation.  Nor  can  I  agree  to  the  statement  that  the  cost  of  opera- 
tion of  a  sea-level  canal  would  be  $800,000  per  annum  less  than  in  the 
case  of  a  lock  canal ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  I  am  fully  satisfied  that  the 
expense  would  be  very  much  greater  in  the  sea-level  project,  if  proper 
allowance  is  made  for  interest  charges  upon  the  additional  outlay, 
which  cannot  be  rightfully  ignored.  Upon  this  important  point  the 
evidence  of  the  engineers  and  of  the  minority  members  of  the  Board 
is  strongly  in  favor  of  the  lock-canal  project. 

As  regards  ultimate  cost,  the  estimates  of  the  majority  are  very 
much  more  indefinite  and  conjectural  than  the  more  carefully  prepared 
estimates  of  the  minority  of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers. 
Upon  this  point  the  majority  of  the  Senate  committee  say: 

There  are  two  estimates  now  before  the  Senate,  both  originating  with  the  Board  of 
Consuhing  Engineers.  The  basis  of  computation  of  cost  at  certain  unit  prices  was 
adopted  unanimously  by  the  Board,  and  we  are  told  that  the  cost,  with  the  20  per 
cent,  allowance  for  contingencies,   will  be,   for  the    sea-level    canal,   the  sum  of 

28 


$247,021,200.  Your  committee  has  adopted  the  figures  stated  by  the  majority 
on  page  64  of  its  report  of  a  total  of  $250,000,000  for  the  ultimate  final  cost  of 
the  sea-level  canal. 

The  estimate  of  the  minority  for  a  lock  canal  at  a  level  of  eighty- 
five  feet  is,  in  round  figures,  $140,000,000,  or  about  $110,000,000  less 
than  for  a  sea-level  canal,  which  would  represent  a  difference  of 
$2,200,000  per  annum  in  interest  charges  at  the  lowest  possible  rate 
of  two  per  cent.  The  majority  of  the  Senate  committee  attempt  to 
meet  this  difference  by  capitalizing  the  estimated  higher  maintenance 
charge,  which  they  fix  at  $800,000  per  annum,  and  they  thus  increase 
the  total  cost  of  a  lock  canal  by  $40,000,000;  but  this,  I  hold,  involves 
a  serious  financial  error,  unless  a  corresponding  allowance  is  made  for 
the  ultimate  cost  of  the  sea-level  project.  There  is,  however,  no 
serious  disagreement  upon  the  point  that  a  sea-level  canal  in  any 
event  would  cost  a  very  much  larger  sum  as  an  original  outlay,  cer- 
tainly not  less  than  $120,000,000  more,  and,  in  all  probability,  in  the 
opinion  of  qualified  engineers,  including  Mr.  Stevens,  the  chief  engi- 
neer, twice  that  sum. 

Reference  is  made  in  the  report  to  the  probable  value  of  the  land 
which  will  be  inundated  under  the  lock-canal  project  with  a  dam  at 
Gatun,  the  value  of  which  has  been  placed  at  approximately  $300,000. 
The  majority  of  the  Senate  committee  estimate  that  this  amount 
might  reach  $10,000,000,  or  as  much  as  was  paid  for  the  entire  Canal 
Zone.  The  estimate  is  based  upon  the  price  of  certain  lands  required 
by  the  government  near  the  city  of  Panama,  but  one  might  as  well  esti- 
mate the  worth  of  land  in  the  Adirondacks  by  the  prices  paid  for  real 
estate  in  lower  New  York.  The  item,  no  doubt,  requires  to  be  properly 
taken  into  account,  but  two  independent  estimates  fix  the  probable 
sum  at  $300,000  for  lands  which  are  otherwise  practically  valueless 
and  which  would  only  acquire  value  the  moment  the  United  States 
should  need  them.  In  my  opinion,  the  value  of  these  lands  will  not 
form  a  serious  item  in  the  total  cost  of  the  canal,  and  I  have  every 
reason  to  believe  that  independent  estimates  of  the  minority  engineers 
of  the  Consulting  Board,  and  of  Mr.  Stevens,  may  be  relied  upon  as 
conservative. 

The  majority  of  the  Senate  committee  further  say  that — 

It  is  not  necessary  to  dwell  upon  the  fact  that  all  naval  commanders  and  com- 
mercial masters  of  the  great  national  and  private  vessels  of  the  world  are  almost  to 
a  man  opposed  unalterably  to  the  introduction  of  any  lock  to  lift  vessels  over  the  low 
summit  that  nature  has  left  for  us  to  remove. 

I  am  not  aware  that  any  material  evidence  of  this  character  has 
come  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Isthmian  Affairs,  investigating 
conditions  at  Panama.  I  do  know  this,  however,  that  until  very 
recently  it  has  been  the  American  project  to  construct  a  lock  canal. 
All  the  former  advocates  of  an  American  canal  by  way  of  Panama  or 

29 


Nicaragua,  or  by  any  other  route,  contemplated  a  lock  canal  of  a  much 
more  complex  character  than  the  present  Panama  project.  All  the 
advocates  of  a  canal  across  the  Isthmus,  including  many  distinguished 
engineers  in  the  army  and  navy,  have  been  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal,  and 
almost  without  exception  have  reported  upon  the  feasibility  of  a  lock 
canal  across  the  Isthmus  and  upon  its  advantages  to  commerce  and 
navigation,  and  in  military  and  naval  operations  in  case  of  war.  The 
Nicaragua  Canal,  as  recommended  to  Congress  and  as  favored  by  the 
first  Walker  Commission,  provided  for  a  lock  project  far  more  complex 
than  the  proposition  now  under  consideration. 

Colonel  Totten,  who  built  the  Panama  railroad,  recommended  as 
early  as  1857  the  construction  of  a  lock  canal;  Naval  Commissioner 
Lull,  who  made  a  careful  survey  of  the  Isthmus  in  1874,  recommended 
a  lock  canal  with  a  summit  level  of  124  feet  and  with  24  locks."  Ad- 
miral Ammen,  who,  by  authority  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  attended 
the  Isthmian  Congress  of  1879,  favored  a  lock  project,  in  strong  oppo- 
sition to  the  visionary  plan  of  De  Lesseps.  Admiral  Self  ridge  and 
many  other  naval  officers  who  have  been  connected  with  Isthmian 
surveying  and  exploration  have  never,  to  my  knowledge,  by  as  much 
as  a  word  expressed  their  apprehensions  regarding  the  feasibility  or 
practicability  of  a  lock  canal. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  and  canal  history,  the  lock  project  has  very 
properly  been  considered  "an  American  conception  of  the  proper 
treatment  of  the  Panama  canal  problem."  Mr.  C.  D.  Ward,  an 
American  engineer  of  great  ability,  as  early  as  1879  suggested  a  plan 
almost  identical  with  the  one  now  recommended  by  the  minority  of  the 
Consulting  Board,  including  a  dam  at  Gatun,  instead  of  Bohio  or 
Gamboa;  and,  in  the  words  of  a  former  president  of  the  American 
Society  of  Civil  Engineers,  Mr.  Welsh,  "The  first  thought  of  an 
American  engineer  on  looking  at  M.  De  Lesseps*  raised  map  is  to  con- 
vert the  valley  of  the  lower  Chagres  into  an  artificial  lake  some  twenty 
miles  long  by  a  dam  across  the  valley  at  or  near  a  point  where  the  pro- 
posed canal  strikes  it,  a  few  miles  from  Colon,  such  as  was  advocated 
by  C.  D.  Ward  in  1879."  The  site  referred  to  was  Gatun,  and  this  was 
written  in  1880,  when  the  sea-level  project  had  full  sway. 

So  that  it  is  going  entirely  too  far  to  say  that  all  naval  commanders 
and  commercial  masters  are  in  favor  of  the  sea-level  project.  Ad- 
miral Walker  himself,  as  president  of  the  former  Isthmian  Commission, 
and  as  president  of  the  Nicaraguan  Board,  favored  a  lock  canal. 
Eminent  army  engineers,  like  Abbot,  Hains,  Ernst,  and  others,  favor 
the  lock  project.  It  requires  no  very  extensive  knowledge  of  naviga- 
tion to  make  it  clear  that  passing  through  a  waterway  which  for  35 
miles,  or  71  per  cent,  of  its  distance,  will  have  a  width  of  500  feet  or 
more,  compared  with  one  which,  for  the  larger  part,  or  for  some  forty- 
one  miles,  will  have  a  width  of  only  200  feet  or  less,  must  appeal  to  the 

30 


sense  of  security  of  the  skipper  while  taking  his  vessel  through  the 
canal. 

But  it  is  a  question  of  general  principles,  and  not  of  personal  prefer- 
ence. Our  concern  is  with  a  matter  of  fact,  and  not  with  a  theory. 
No  ship-owner  on  the  Great  Lakes  considers  it  a  serious  hindrance  to 
navigation  for  vessels  to  pass  through  the  lock  of  the  "Soo"  Canal;  no 
shipper  running  1,000-ton  barges  through  the  future  Erie  Canal  will 
have  the  least  apprehension  of  danger  or  destruction;  no  captain 
navigating  a  vessel  or  boat  through  the  proposed  deep  waterway  from 
the  ocean  to  the  Lakes  will  hesitate  to  pass  through  locks  with  a  pro- 
posed lift  of  over  forty  feet.  These  apprehensions  are  imaginary  and 
not  real.  They  are  not  derived  from  experience  or  from  a  summary 
statement  of  shipmasters  and  naval  ofl&cers,  but  from  the  individual 
expressions  and  prejudice  of  a  few  who  are  opposed  to  the  lock  project. 
I  am  confident  that  if  the  matter  is  left  to  the  practical  navigator,  to 
the  ship-owner,  and  to  the  self-reliant  naval  officer,  there  will  be  no 
serious  disagreement  with  the  opinion  that  a  lock  canal,  which  can  be 
built  within  a  reasonable  period  of  time,  is  preferable  to  any  sea-level 
canal  which  may  be  built  and  opened  to  navigation  twenty  years 
hence  or  later. 

There  are  two  objections  made  by  the  majority  of  the  Senate 
committee  against  a  lock  canal  which  require  more  extended  considera- 
tion. These  are,  the  protection  of  the  canal  in  case  of  war  and  the 
danger  of  serious  injury  or  total  destruction  by  possible  earth  move- 
ments or  so-called  "earthquakes."  Regarding  the  military  aspects 
of  the  canal  problem,  the  majority  of  the  Senate  committee  say: 

The  Spooner  act  and  the  Hay-Varilla  treaty  contemplated  the  fortification  and 
military  protection  of  the  canal  route.  No  proposition  affecting  this  policy  is  now 
before  the  Senate.  In  so  far  as  the  type  of  canal  to  be  adopted  has  a  bearing  upon 
the  jeopardy  to  or  immunity  of  the  canal  from  risk  of  malicious  injury,  the  subject  of 
safety  and  protection  is  pertinent  and  most  important.  If  a  canal  of  one  type  would 
be  more  liable  to  injury  than  another,  this  liability  should  under  no  circumstances  be 
neglected  in  determining  the  type  or  plan.  It  does  not  require  argument  that  the 
use  of  the  canal  by  the  United  States  will  cease  if  the  control  passes  to  a  hostile  power 
between  which  and  the  United  States  a  state  of  war  exists,  but  this  is  true  whatever 
the  type  may  be. 

As  the  majority  of  the  committee  point  out,  "no  proposition  affect- 
ing this  project  is  now  before  the  Senate."  In  my  opinion,  none  is 
necessary.  The  neutrality  of  the  canal  is,  by  implication  at  least, 
assured,  and  we  have  pledged  our  national  good  faith  that  the  waterway 
will  be  open  to  all  the  nations  of  the  world.  Some  time  in  the  future, 
when  the  canal  is  completed  and  an  accepted  fact,  it  may  be  advisable 
to  adopt  the  course  pursued  in  the  case  of  the  Suez  Canal.  The  origi- 
nal concession  for  that  canal  provided,  by  section  3,  for  its  subsequent 
fortification,  but  this  was  never  carried  into  effect.     By  a  convention 

31 


dated  December  22,  1888,  among  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  other 
nations,  the  free  navigation  of  the  Suez  Canal  was  made  a  matter  of 
international  agreement,  and  the  same  has  been  reprinted  as  Senate 
Document  No.  151,  Fifty-sixth  Congress,  first  session,  under  date  of 
February  6,   1900. 

This,  in  any  event,  is  a  problem  of  the  future.  The  canal  is  the 
property  of  the  United  States,  and  we  shall  always  retain  control.  In 
the  event  of  war  we  shall  rely  with  confidence  upon  our  navy  to  protect 
our  interests  on  the  Pacific  and  in  the  Caribbean  Sea,  but  even  more 
may  we  rely  upon  the  all-important  fact  that  it  could  never  be  to  the 
interest  of  any  other  nation  sufficient  in  size  to  be.  at  ,war  with  us  to 
destroy  this  international  waterway,  which  will  become  an  important 
necessity  to  the  commerce  of  each  and  all.  No  neutral  nation  engaged 
in  extensive  commerce  or  trade  would  for  an  instant  allow  another 
nation  at  war  with  the  United  States  to  injure  or  destroy  the  canal  or  to 
seriously  interfere  with  the  traffic  passing  through  it.  To  destroy  as 
much  as  a  single  lock,  to  injure  as  much  as  a  single  gate,  would  be 
considered  equal  to  an  act  of  war  by  every  commercial  nation  of  the 
earth.  In  this  simple  fact  lies  a  greater  assurance  of  safety  than  in  all 
the  treaties  which  might  be  made  or  in  all  the  fortifications  which 
might  be  established  to  protect  the  canal. 

The  majority  of  the  committee  well  say  in  their  report,  that  the 
power  of  mischief  "is  within  easy  reach  of  all."  The  possibility  of  an 
assumed  occurrence  is  very  remote  from  its  reasonable  probabiHty. 
We  have  to  rely  upon  our  own  good  faith  and  the  watchful  eyes  of  our 
officers.  Against  possible  contingencies,  such  as  are  implied  in  the 
assumed  destruction  of  the  locks  by  dynamite  or  other  high  explosives, 
we  can  do  no  more  than  take  the  same  precautions  which  we  take  in  all 
other  matters  of  national  importance.  We  have  to  take  our  chances 
the  same  as  any  other  nation  would ;  the  same  as  commercial  enterprise 
would.  Certainly  the  remote  possibility  of  such  an  event,  the  still 
more  remote  contingency  that  the  injury  would  be  serious  or  fatal  to 
the  operation  of  the  canal,  should  not  govern  in  a  decision  to  construct  a 
canal  for  the  use  of  the  present  generation  rather  than  for  the  genera- 
tions to  come.  No  canal  can  be  built  free  from  vulnerable  points;  no 
forts,  no  battleships,  can  be  built  free  from  such  a  risk.  It  would  be 
folly  to  delay  the  construction  of  a  canal;  it  would  be  folly  to  sink  a 
hundred  million  dollars  or  more  upon  so  remote  a  contingency  as  this, 
which  belongs  to  the  realm  of  fanciful  or  morbid  imagination  rather 
than  to  the  domain  of  substantial  fact  and  actual  experience. 

As  a  last  resort,  the  opposition  to  a  lock  canal  brings  forward  the 
earthquake  argument.  It  is  a  curious  reminder  of  the  early  and  bitter 
opposition  to  the  building  of  the  Suez  Canal;  its  enemies  had  to  fall 
back  upon  the  absurd  theory  that  the  canal  would  prove  a  failure 
because  the  blowing  sands  of  the  desert  would  soon  fill  the  channel. 

32 


It  was  seriously  proposed  to  erect  a  stone  wall  four  feet  high  on  each 
side  of  the  embankment  to  provide  against  this  imaginary  danger  to 
the  canal.  Another  early  objection  to  the  Suez  Canal  was  that  the 
Red  Sea  level  was  30  feet  above  the  level  of  the  Mediterranean,  only 
set  at  rest  in  1847  by  a  special  commission,  which  included  Mr.  Robert 
Stephenson,  the  great  son  of  a  great  father,  bitter  to  the  last  in  his 
opposition  to  the  canal,  which  he  considered  an  impracticable  engineer- 
ing scheme.  There  was  much  talk  about  the  assumed  prevalence  of 
strong  westerly  winds  on  the  southern  Mediterranean  coast,  and  the 
danger  of  constantly  increasing  deposits  of  the  Nile,  it  was  said,  would 
render  the  establishment  of  a  port  impossible.  It  was  necessary  to 
place  a  war-ship  for  a  whole  winter  at  anchor  three  miles  from  the 
shore  to  prove  the  error  of  this  assumption  and  set  at  rest  a  foolish 
rumor  which  came  near  proving  fatal  to  the  enterprise. 

Earthquakes  have  occurred  on  the  Isthmus,  and  there  is  record  of 
one  shock  of  some  consequence  in  1882.  The  matter  has  been  in- 
quired into  in  a  general  way  by  the  various  Isthmian  commissions,  and 
assumed  some  prominence  during  the  discussions  and  debates  regard- 
ing a  choice  of  routes.  It  was  plain  to  even  the  least  informed  that  the 
volcanic  belt  of  Nicaragua  constituted  a  real  menace  to  a  canal  in  that 
region;  and  one  of  the  strongest  arguments  advanced  in  the  minority 
report  of  the  Senate  committee  of  1902,  submitted  by  Senator  Kit- 
tredge,  now  a  leading  advocate  of  the  sea-level  project,  in  opposition  to 
the  Nicaragua  Canal,  was  the  assertion  of  the  practical  freedom  of  the 
Panama  Isthmus  from  the  danger  of  earth  movements. 

The  minority  of  the  Senate  committee  of  1902  in  their  report,  sum- 
ming up  the  final  reasons  in  favor  of  the  Panama  route  (section  12),  said : 

At  Panama  earthquakes  are  few  and  unimportant,  while  the  Nicaraguan  route 
passes  over  a  well-known  coastal  weakness.  Only  five  disturbances  of  any  sort  were 
recorded  at  Panama,  all  very  slight,  while  similar  official  records  at  San  Jose  de  Costa 
Rica,  near  the  route  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal,  show  for  the  same  period  fifty  shocks,  a 
number  of  which  were  severe.  (P.  11,  S.  Rep.  783,  part  2,  57th  Cong.,  1st  session, 
May  31,  1902.) 

In  another  part  of  their  report  the  committee  said : 

With  the  dreadful  lessons  of  Martinique  and  St.  Vincent  fresh  in  our  minds,  we 
should  be  utterly  inexcusable  if  we  deliberately  selected  a  route  for  an  Isthmian  canal 
in  a  region  so  volcanic  and  dangerous,  when  a  route  is  open  to  us  which  is  exposed  to 
none  of  these  dangers  and  is  in  every  other  respect  more  advantageous. 

And  they  quote  Professor  Heilprin,  an  authority  on  the  subject,  in 
part,  as  follows: 

It  has,  however,  been  known  for  a  full  quarter  of  a  century  that  the  main  Andes 
do  not  traverse  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  that  there  are  no  active  or  recently 
decayed  volcanoes  in  any  part  of  the  Isthmus.  So  far,  however,  as  danger  from 
direct  volcanic  contacts  is  concerned,  the  Panama  route  is  exempt.     (Pp.  22-23.) 

33 


And  further: 

This  district  represents  the  most  stable  portion  of  Central  America.  No  volcanic 
eruptions  have  occurred  there  since  the  end  of  the  Miocene  epoch,  and  there  are  no 
active  volcanoes  between  Chiriqui  and  ToUma,  a  distance  of  about  four  hundred 
miles.  Such  earthquakes  as  have  occurred  are  chiefly  those  proceeding  from  the 
disturbed  districts  on  either  hand,  with  intensity  much  diminished  by  the  distance 
traversed.     The  canal  lies  in  a  sort  of  dead  angle  of  comparative  safety. 

The  report  continues : 

The  situation  being,  then,  that  the  danger  from  volcanoes  at  Panama  is  nothing, 
and  that  from  earthquakes  practically  nothing,  while  at  Nicaragua  the  canal  would 
be  situated  in  one  of  the  most  dangerous  regions  of  the  world  from  both  these  causes, 
the  question  should  be  considered  settled. 

This  was  the  opinion  of  the  committee  of  1902;  it  was  emphatic  and 
plain  in  its  language;  it  had  considered  expert  views  and  the  available 
data.  It  had  before  it  the  full  report  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal  Com- 
mission, printed  under  date  of  May  15th  of  the  same  year,  Chapter 
VII  of  which  considers  the  subject  at  much  greater  length  than  has 
been  done  since  that  time  and  with  a  full  knowledge  of  the  facts  and 
free  from  bias  or  prejudice.  With  the  then  recent  occurrence  at 
Mount  Pel^e  in  mind,  and  with  a  full  understanding  of  the  liability  of 
the  Isthmus  to  seismic  shocks  of  minor  importance,  the  committee 
emphatically  indorsed  the  lock-canal  project  at  Panama. 

Much  can  be  said  with  regard  to  this  matter,  and  it  is  one  which 
should,  and  no  doubt  will,  receive  the  most  careful  consideration  of  the 
engineers  in  charge  of  the  work.  Seismic  disturbances  have  occurred 
in  all  parts  of  the  world,  and  they  have  occurred  at  Panama.  Where 
they  are  not  directly  of  volcanic  origin  they  appear  to  be  the  result  of 
subsidence  or  contraction  of  the  earth's  crust,  and  they  have  occmred 
and  caused  serious  destruction  far  from  centers  of  volcanic  activity, 
among  other  places,  at  Lisbon,  Portugal,  and  at  Charleston,  S.  C. 
Some  sections  of  the  earth,  as  for  illustration  Japan  and  the  Philip- 
pines, are  no  doubt  more  subject  to  these  movements  than  others,  and 
sections  subject  to  such  movements  at  one  period  of  time  may  be 
exempt  for  many  years  if  not  forever  thereafter. 

The  fearful  earthquake  which  affected  Charleston,  S.  C,  in  1886 
had  no  corresponding  precedent  in  that  section,  nor  has  it  been  fol- 
lowed by  a  similar  disturbance.  Regardless  of  the  terrible  experience 
of  1 886,  the  government  has  now  in  course  of  construction  at  Charles- 
ton a  navy-yard,  and  a  great  dry-dock,  costing  many  millions  of  dollars, 
which  will  be  operated  by  locks  or  gates,  and,  I  presume,  the  question 
of  earthquakes  or  earth  movements  has  not  been  raised  in  any  of  the 
reports  which  have  been  made  regarding  this  undertaking.  Earth- 
quakes formerly  were  quite  frequent  in  New  England,  and  they  ex- 
tended to  New  York  during  the  early  years  of  our  history,  and  for  a 
time  Boston  and  Newbury,  Mass.,  Deerfield,  N.  H.,  and  particularly 

34 


East  Haddam,  Conn.,  were  the  centers  of  seismic  activity,  which  by- 
inference  might  be  used  as  an  argument  against  our  navy-yards  at 
Portsmouth,  N.  H.,  and  Charlestown,  Mass.,  our  torpedo  station  at 
Newport,  or  the  fortifications  at  Willets  Point.  The  earthquake 
which  destroyed  Lisbon  in  1755  might  with  equal  propriety  be  used  as 
an  argument  against  the  building  of  the  extensive  docks  and  fortifica- 
tions at  Gibraltar,  but  no  one,  I  think,  has  ever  questioned  the  solidity 
of  the  Rock. 

Seismology  is  a  very  complex  branch  of  geologic  inquiry  and  it  is  a 
subject  regarding  which  very  little  of  determining  value  is  known. 
Theories  have  been  advanced  that  under  certain  geological  conditions 
earth  movements  would  be  comparatively  infrequent,  if  not  impossible. 
Whether  such  conditions  exist  at  Panama  would  have  to  be  determined 
by  the  investigations  of  qualified  experts.  It  would  seem,  however, 
from  such  data  as  are  available,  that  the  local  conditions  are  decidedly 
favorable  to  a  comparative  immunity  of  this  region  from  serious 
seismic  shocks,  at  least  such  as  would  do  great  and  general  damage. 
Nor  can  it  be  argued  that  the  locks  and  dams  would  be  exposed  to 
special  risk.  The  earthquake  of  1882  did  more  or  less  damage,  but  the 
reports  are  of  a  very  fragmentary  character.  Newspaper  reports  in 
matters  of  this  kind  have  very  small  value.  Injury  was  done  to  the 
railway,  but  not  of  very  serious  consequence. 

If  the  risk  exists,  it  would  ajffect  equally  a  sea-level  canal,  in  that  it 
would  threaten  the  tidal  lock,  the  dam  at  Gamboa,  and  the  excavation 
through  Culebra  cut.  Very  little  is  known  regarding  earthquake 
motions,  and  there  are  very  few  seismic  elements  which  are  really  cal- 
culable in  conformity  to  a  mathematical  theory  of  probability.  It  is  a 
subject  which  has  not  received  the  attention  in  this  country  of  which 
it  is  deserving,  but  enough  of  seismic  motion  is  known  to  warrant  the 
conclusion  that  the  Senate  committee  of  1902  was,  in  all  human 
probability,  entirely  correct  when  it  made  light  of  the  danger  of  the 
probability  of  seismic  shocks  at  Panama. 

In  fine,  the  earthquake  argument  has  little  or  no  force  against  a 
lock-canal  project,  and  it  has  never  received  serious  consideration  as 
such  or  been  used  in  arguments  against  a  lock  canal  until  the  recent 
San  Francisco  disaster  brought  the  subject  prominently  before  the 
public.  It  is  a  danger  as  remote  as  a  possible  destruction  of  the  pro- 
posed terminal  plants  at  Colon  and  Panama  by  flood  waves  equal  in 
magnitude  to  the  one  which  destroyed  Galveston  in  1900,  but  such 
dangers  are  inherent  in  all  human  undertakings.  They  must  be  taken 
as  a  matter  of  chance  and  remote  possibility,  which  for  all  present 
purposes  may  be  left  out  of  account,  except  that  the  subject  should 
receive  the  due  consideration  of  the  engineers  and  perhaps  be  made  a 
matter  of  special  and  comprehensive  inquiry  by  the  Geological  Survey. 
In  any  serious  consideration  of  the  facts  for  or  against  a  lock  canal,  I 

35 


am  confident  that  the  earthquake  risk  may  safely  be  ignored.  The 
comprehensive  report  of  the  minority  members  of  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Interoceanic  Affairs  is  a  sufficient  and  conclusive  answer  to 
all  the  important  points  which  are  in  controversy,  and  it  remains  for 
Congress  to  cut  the  "Gordian  knot"  and  put  an  end  to  an  interminable 
discussion  of  much  solid  and  substantial  conviction  on  the  one  hand 
and  of  a  vast  amount  of  opinion  and  guesswork  on  the  other  hand. 
All  of  the  evidence,  all  of  the  supplementary  expert  testimony  which 
may  be  obtained  upon  the  merits  of  the  two  propositions,  will  not 
change  the  position  of  those  who  rest  their  conclusions  upon  American 
experience  and  upon  the  judgment  of  American  engineers,  and  who 
favor  a  lock  canal.  While  there  is  no  doubt  that  such  a  canal  can  be 
constructed  and  can  be  made  a  practicable  waterway,  there  is  a  very 
serious  question  whether  a  sea-level  canal  can  be  constructed  and  made 
a  safe  and  practicable  waterway,  at  least  within  the  limits  of  the  esti- 
mated amount  of  cost  and  within  the  estimated  time. 

The  view  which  I  have  tried  to  impress  upon  the  Senate  is  nothing 
more  nor  less  than  a  business  view  of  what  is,  for  all  practical  purposes, 
only  a  business  proposition.  If  a  lock  canal  can  be  built,  useful  for  all 
purposes,  at  half  the  cost  and  within  half  the  time  of  a  sea-level  canal, 
then  I  can  come  to  no  other  conclusion  than  that  a  lock  canal  would  be 
decidedly  to  our  political  and  commercial  advantage.  A  decision, 
however,  should  be  arrived  at.  The  canal  project  has  reached  a  stage 
where  the  final  plan  or  type  must  be  determined,  and  it  is  the  duty  of 
Congress  to  act  and  to  fix,  for  once  and  for  all  time,  the  type  of  canal, 
with  the  same  courage  and  freedom  from  prejudice  or  bias  as  was  the 
case  in  the  decision  which  finally  fixed  the  route  by  way  of  Panama. 

Any  amount  of  additional  testimony  and  expert  opinion  will  only 
add  to  the  confusion  and  tend  to  produce  a  more  hopeless  state  of 
affairs.  Let  Congress  fix  the  type  in  broad  outlines  and  leave  it  to 
responsible  engineers  in  actual  charge  to  solve  problems  in  detail,  and 
to  adapt  themselves  to  local  conditions  and  to  new  problems  which  in 
the  course  of  construction  are  certain  to  arise.  Let  us  take  counsel  of 
the  past,  most  of  all  from  the  experience  gained  in  the  construction  of 
the  Suez  Canal,  an  engineering  and  commercial  success  which  chal- 
lenges the  admiration  of  the  world.  We  know  how  near  it  came  to 
utter  defeat  by  the  conflict  of  opinion,  by  the  intrigue  of  conniving  and 
jealous  powers,  and  last,  but  not  least,  by  the  ill-founded  apprehen- 
sions and  fears  of  those  who  were  searching  the  vast  domain  of  con- 
jecture and  remote  possibilities  for  arguments  to  cause  a  temporary 
delay  or  ultimate  abandonment. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  secure  the  opinion  of  eminent  authority  for  or 
against  any  project  when  the  facts  themselves  are  in  dispute,  and 
when  the  objects  and  aims  are  not  well  defined.  The  great  Lord 
Palmerston,  the  most  bitter  opponent  of  the  Suez  Canal  scheme,  in 

36 


want  of  a  more  convincing  argument,  seriously  claimed  that  France 
would  send  soldiers  disguised  as  workmen  to  the  Isthmus  of  Suez, 
later  to  take  possession  of  Egypt  and  make  it  a  French  colony.  By 
one  method  or  another  Palmerston  tried  to  defeat  the  scheme  in  its 
beginning  and  to  bring  it  to  disaster  during  the  period  of  construction. 
It  is  a  far  from  creditable  story.  History  always  more  or  less  repeats 
itself,  whether  it  be  in  politics  or  engineering  enterprise,  but  in  few 
affairs  are  there  more  convincing  parallels  than  in  the  canal  projects  of 
Panama  and  Suez.  Lord  Palmerston  and  Sir  Henry  Bulwer,  then  the 
ambassador  at  Constantinople,  did  all  in  their  power  to  destroy  public 
confidence  in  the  enterprise,  and  they  were  completely  successful  in 
preventing  English  investments  in  the  stock  of  the  canal.* 

It  was  the  same  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  who,  in  1850,  succeeded  by 
questionable  diplomatic  methods  in  foisting  upon  the  American  people 
a  treaty  which  was  contrary  to  their  best  interests  and  which  for  half 
a  century  was  a  hindrance  and  barrier  to  an  American  Isthmian  canal. 
We  owe  it  chiefly  to  the  masterly  and  straightforward  statesmanship 
of  the  late  John  Hay  that  this  obstacle  to  our  progress  was  disposed  of 
to  the  entire  satisfaction  of  both  nations.  I  refer  to  these  matters, 
which  are  facts  of  history,  only  to  point  out  how  an  interminable  dis- 
cussion of  matters  of  detail  is  certain  to  delay  and  do  great  injury  to 
projects  which  should  only  receive  Congressional  consideration  in 
broad  outlines  and  upon  fundamental  principles.  If  we  are  to  enter 
into  a  discussion  of  engineering  conflicts,  if  we  are  to  deliberate  upon 
mere  matters  of  structural  detail,  then  an  entire  session  of  Congress 
will  not  suffice  to  solve  all  the  problems  which  will  arise  in  connection 
with  that  enterprise  in  the  course  of  time.  I  draw  attention  to  the 
Suez  experience  solely  to  point  out  the  error  of  taking  into  serious 
account  minor  and  far-fetched  objections  which  assume  an  undue 
magnitude  in  the  public  mind  when  they  are  presented  in  lurid  colors  of 
impending  disasters  to  a  national  enterprise  of  vast  extent  and  im- 
portance. 

So  eminent  an  engineer  as  Mr.  Robert  Stephenson  by  his  expert 
opinion  deluded  the  British  people  into  the  belief  that  the  Suez  Canal 
would  not  be  practicable ;  that,  even  if  completed,  it  would  be  nothing 
but  a  stagnant  ditch.     Said  Palmerston  to  De  Lesseps: 

All  the  engineers  of  Europe  might  say  what  they  pleased,  he  knew  more  than  they 
did,  and  his  opinion  would  never  change  one  iota,  and  he  would  oppose  the  work  to 
the  end. 

Stephenson  confirmed  this  view  and  held  that  the  canal  would 
never  be  completed  except  at  an  enormous  expense,  too  great  to  war- 
rant any  expectation  of  return — a  judgment  both  ill  advised  and 


*The  Maritime  Canal  of  Suez,   from  its  inauguration,   November    17,    1869,   to  the  year  1884,  by 
Prof.  J.  E.  Nourse,  U.  S.  N.,  Washington,  1884  (Senate  Document  198,  48th  Congress,  1st  session). 

37 


erroneous  as  was  clearly  proved  by  subsequent  events.  I  need  only 
say  that  the  Suez  Canal  is  to-day  an  extremely  profitable  waterway, 
and  that  although  the  work  was  commenced  and  brought  to  comple- 
tion without  a  single  English  shilling,  through  French  enterprise  and 
upon  the  judgment  of  French  engineers,  it  was  only  a  comparatively 
few  years  later  when,  as  a  matter  of  necessity  and  logical  sequence,  the 
controlling  interest  in  the  canal  was  purchased  by  the  English  govern- 
ment, which  has  since  made  of  that  waterway  the  most  extensive  use 
for  purposes  of  peace  and  of  war. 

These  are  the  facts  of  history,  and  they  are  not  disputed.  Shall 
history  repeat  itself?  Shall  we  delay  or  miscarry  in  our  efforts  to 
complete  a  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  upon  similar  preten- 
sions of  assumed  dangers  and  possibilities  of  disaster,  all  more  or  less 
the  result  of  engineering  guesswork?  Shall  we  take  fright  at  the  talk 
about  the  mischief-maker  with  his  stick  of  dynamite,  bent  upon  the 
destruction  of  the  locks  and  the  vital  parts  of  the  machinery,  when 
history  has  its  parallel  during  the  Suez  Canal  agitation  in  "the  Arab 
shepherd,  who,  flushed  with  the  opportunity  for  mischief  and  with  a 
few  strokes  of  a  pickax,  could  empty  the  canal  in  a  few  minutes"? 
Shall  we  be  swayed  by  foolish  fears  and  apprehensions  of  earthquakes 
or  tidal  waves,  and  waste  millions  of  money  and  years  of  time  upon  a 
pure  conjecture,  a  pure  theory  deduced  from  fragmentary  facts? 
Again  the  facts  of  canal  history  furnish  the  parallel  of  Stephenson  and 
other  engineers,  who  successfully  frightened  English  investors  out  of 
the  Suez  enterprise  by  the  statement  that  the  canal  would  soon  fill  up 
with  the  moving  sands  of  the  desert,  that  one  of  the  lakes  through 
which  the  canal  would  pass  would  soon  fill  up  with  salt,  that  navigation 
of  the  Red  Sea  would  be  too  dangerous  and  difficult,  that  ships  would 
fear  to  approach  Port  Said  because  of  dangerous  seas,  and,  finally, 
that  in  any  event  it  would  be  impossible  to  keep  the  passage  open  to 
the  Mediterranean. 

It  was  this  kind  of  guesswork  and  conjecture  which  was  advanced 
as  an  argument  by  engineers  of  eminence  and  sustained  by  one  of  the 
foremost  statesmen  of  the  century.  How  absurd  it  all  seems  now  in 
the  sunlight  of  history!  The  Panama  Canal  is  a  business  enterprise, 
even  if  carried  on  by  the  nation,  and  with  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
general  facts  and  principles  we  require  no  more  expert  evidence,  so 
called,  nor  additional  volumes  of  engineering  testimony.  The  nation 
is  committed  to  the  construction  of  a  canal.  The  enterprise  is  one  of 
imperative  necessity  to  commerce,  navigation,  and  national  defense, 
and  any  further  discussion,  any  needless  waste  of  time  and  money,  is 
little  short  of  indifference  to  the  national  interests  and  objects  which 
are  at  stake 

Of  objections  to  either  plan  there  is  no  end,  and  there  will  be  no  end 
as  long  as  the  subject  remains  open  for  discussion.     To  answer  such 

38 


objections  in  detail,  to  search  the  records  for  proof  in  support  of  one 
theory  or  another,  is  a  mere  waste  of  time  which  can  lead  to  no  possible 
useful  result.  Among  others,  for  illustration,  there  has  been  placed 
before  us  a  letter  from  the  chief  engineer  of  the  Manchester  Ship 
Canal,  whd  is  emphatically  in  favor  of  a  sea-level  waterway.  It  would 
have  been  much  more  interesting  and  much  more  valuable  to  the 
members  of  Congress  to  have  received  from  Mr.  Hunter  a  statement 
as  to  why  he  should  have  changed  his  opinions;  or  why,  in  1898,  he 
should  have  signed  the  unanimous  report  of  the  technical  commission 
in  favor  of  a  lock  canal,  while  now  he  so  emphatically  sustains  those  who 
favor  the  sea-level  project.  It  is  not  going  too  far  to  say,  appealing  to 
the  facts  of  history,  that  Mr.  Hunter  may  be  seriously  in  error  in  this 
matter  and  may  have  drawn  upon  his  imagination  rather  than  upon 
his  engineering  experience,  the  same  as  Mr.  Robert  Stephenson  was  in 
serious  error  in  his  bitter  opposition  to  the  canal  enterprise  at  Suez. 

Mr.  Hunter,  in  his  letter,  argues,  among  other  points,  that  the  lifts 
of  the  proposed  locks  would  be  without  precedent.  Without  prece- 
dent? Why,  of  course,  they  would  be  without  precedent.  Is  not 
practically  every  large  American  engineering  enterprise  without  prece- 
dent? Was  not  the  Brie  Canal,  completed  in  1825,  without  precedent? 
Were  not  the  first  steamboat  and  the  first  locomotive  without  prece- 
dent? Were  not  the  Hoosac  Tunnel  and  the  Brooklyn  Bridge  feats  of 
American  engineering  enterprise  without  precedent? 

Without  precedent  is  the  great  barge  canal  which  the  State  of  New 
York  is  about  to  build,  which  will  mean  a  complete  reconstruction  of 
the  existing  waterway  which  connects  the  ocean  with  the  Great  Lakes.* 

All  this  is  without  precedent.  But  it  is  American.  It  is  progress, 
and  takes  the  necessary  risk  to  leave  the  world  better,  at  least  in  a 
material  way,  than  we  found  it.  In  the  proposed  deep  waterway, 
which  is  certain  some  day  to  be  built  to  connect  the  uttermost  ends  of 
the  Great  Lakes  with  tide-water  on  the  Atlantic,  able  and  competent 
engineers  of  the  largest  experience  have  designed  locks  with  a  lift  of  52 
feet.f  That  will  be  without  precedent.  On  the  Oswego  Canal, 
proposed  as  a  part  of  the  new  barge  canal  of  the  State  of  New  York, 
there  will  be  six  locks,  two  of  which  will  each  have  a  lift  of  28  feet,t  and 
that  will  be  without  precedent,  but  neither  dangerous  nor  detrimental 
to  navigation  interests. 

Need  I  further  appeal  to  the  facts  of  past  canal  history?  Is  it 
necessary  to  recite  one  of  the  best  known  and  most  honorable  chapters 
in  the  history  of  inland  waterways — I  mean  the  problems  and  difficul- 


♦For  a  history  of  American  canal  building  enterprises  see  History  of  New  York  Canals,  ch.  5. 

tReport  of  the  Board  of  Engineers  on  Deep  Waterways,  H.  of  R.,  Doc.  No.  149,   56th  Congress, 
2d  session,  Atlas. 

{Hbtory  of  New  York  Canals,  Appendix  L,  Annual  Report  of  the  State  Engineer  and  Surveyor, 
Vol.  II,  Albany,.N.  Y.,  1905. 

39 


ties  inherent  in  the  great  project  of  constructing  the  canal  of  Langue- 
doc,  or  "Canal  du  Midi,"  which  forms  a  water  communication  be- 
tween the  Mediterranean  and  the  Garonne  and  between  the  Garonne 
and  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  one  of  the  best  known  canals  in  France  and 
in  the  world?  Need  I  refer  to  that  pathetic  story  of  its  chief  engineer, 
Riquet,  one  of  the  greatest  of  French  patriots,  who,  in  his  abiding  faith 
in  this  great  engineering  feat,  stood  practically  alone?  Need  I  recall 
that  he  met  with  scant  assistance  from  the  government,  with  the  most 
strenuous  opposition  from  his  countrymen ;  that  he  was  treated  even  as 
a  madman  and  that  he  died  of  a  broken  heart  before  the  great  work 
was  finished? 

That  canal  stands  to-day  as  an  engineering  masterwork  and  as  a 
most  suggestive  illustration  of  man's  ingenuity  and  power  to  overcome 
apparently  insuperable  natural  obstacles.  It  has  been  in  existence  and 
successful  operation,  I  think,  since  1681.  For  a  sixth  part  of  its  distance 
it  is  carried  over  mountains  deeply  excavated.  It  has,  I  think,  ninety- 
nine  locks  and  viaducts,  and  as  one  of  its  most  wonderful  features  it  has 
an  octuple  lock,  or  eight  locks  in  flight,  like  a  ladder  from  the  top  of  a  cliff 
to  the  valley  below.  If  in  1681  a  French  engineer  had  the  ability  and 
the  daring  to  conceive  and  construct  an  octuple  lock,  will  any  one 
maintain  that  more  than  two  hundred  years  later,  with  all  the  enor- 
mous advance  in  engineering,  with  a  better  knowledge  of  hydraulics 
and  a  more  perfect  method  of  transportation  and  handling  of  materials 
— will  any  one  maintain  that  we  are  not  to-day  competent  to  construct 
successfully  a  lock  canal  such  as  is  proposed  to  be  built  at  Panama 
upon  the  judgment  of  American  engineers  ? 

Mr.  President,  the  overshadowing  importance  of  the  subject  has  led 
me  to  extend  my  remarks  far  beyond  my  original  intention.  I  express 
my  strong  convictions  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal  and  of  the  necessity  for 
an  early  and  specific  declaration  of  Congress  regarding  the  final  plan 
or  type  of  canal  which  the  nation  wants  to  have  built  at  Panama.  I 
am  confident  that  it  lies  entirely  within  our  power  and  means  to  build 
either  type  of  waterway;  that  our  engineering  skill  can  successfully 
solve  the  technical  problems  involved  in  either  the  lock  or  the  sea- 
level  plan;  but  there  is  one  all-important  factor  which  controls,  and 
which,  in  my  opinion,  should  have  more  weight  than  any  other,  and 
that  is  the  element  of  time.  If  I  could  advance  no  other  reasons,  if  I 
knew  of  no  better  argument  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal,  my  convictions 
would  sustain  the  project  which  can  be  completed  within  a  measurable 
distance  of  years  and  for  the  benefit  and  to  the  advantage  of  the  present 
generation.  Time  flies,  and  the  years  pass  rapidly.  Shall  this  project 
languish  and  linger  and  become  the  spoil  of  political  controversy  and 
a  subject  of  political  attack?  Can  we  conceive  of  anything  more 
likely  to  prove  disastrous  to  the  canal  project  than  political  strife,  which 
proved  the  undoing  of  the  French  canal  enterprise  at  Panama? 

40 


Shall  the  success  of  this  great  project  be  imperiled  by  the  possible 
changes  in  the  fortunes  of  parties  ?  Shall  we  incur  the  risk  that  changes 
in  economic  conditions,  hard  times,  or  panic  and  industrial  depressions 
may  bring  about?  Time  flies,  and  in  the  progress  of  industry  and 
commerce,  in  international  competition  and  the  growth  of  modern 
nations,  no  factor  is  of  more  supreme  importance  than  the  years,  with 
new  opportunities  for  political  and  commercial  development.  Shall 
we,  then,  neglect  our  chances?  Shall  we  fail  to  make  the  most  of  this 
the  greatest  opportunity  for  the  extension  of  our  commerce  and  navi- 
gation into  the  most  distant  seas  which  will  ever  come  to  us  in  our 
history,  because  of  the  demands  of  idealists,  who,  with  theoretical 
notions  of  the  ultimately  desirable,  would  deprive  the  nation  and  the 
world  of  what  is  necessary  and  indispensable  to  those  who  are  living 
now? 

Vast  commercial  and  political  consequences  will  follow  the  opening 
of  the  transisthmian  waterway.  In  the  annals  of  commerce  and 
navigation  it  is  not  conceivable  that  there  will  ever  be  a  greater  event 
or  one  fraught  with  more  momentous  consequences  than  uninterrupted 
navigation  between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific.  I^ittle  enough  can 
we  comprehend  or  anticipate  what  the  far-distant  future  will  bring 
forth,  but  this  much  we  know — that  it  is  our  duty  to  solve  the  prob- 
lems of  to-day  and  not  to  indulge  in  dreams  and  fancies  in  a  vain  effort 
to  solve  the  problems  of  a  far-distant  future. 

But  money  also  counts.  Can  we  defend  an  expenditure  of  an 
additional  $100,000,000  or  more  for  objects  so  remote,  and  upon  a 
basis  of  theory  and  fact  so  slender  and  so  open  to  question,  when  a 
plan  and  a  project  feasible  and  practicable  is  before  us  which  will  meet 
all  of  our  needs  and  the  needs  of  generations  to  come?  Shall  we  disre- 
gard in  the  building  of  this  canal  every  principle  of  a  sound  national 
economy  and  commit  ourselves  to  an  enormous  waste  of  funds  and  to 
the  imposition  of  needless  burdens  upon  the  taxpayers  of  this  nation 
and  upon  the  commerce  of  the  world?  At  least  $2,000,000  more  per 
annum  will  be  required  in  additional  interest  charges,  at  least  $100,- 
000,000  more  will  be  necessary  as  an  original  investment.  Do  we 
fully  realize  what  that  amount  of  money  would  do  if  applied  to  other 
national  purposes  and  projects? 

I  want  to  place  on  record  my  convictions  and  the  reasons  governing 
my  vote  in  favor  of  the  minority  report  for  a  lock  canal  across  the 
Isthmus  at  Panama.  I  entered  upon  an  investigation  of  the  subject 
without  prejudice  or  bias  and  have  examined  the  facts  as  they  have 
been  presented  and  as  they  are  a  matter  of  record  and  of  history.  I 
have  heard  or  read  with  care  the  evidence  as  it  has  been  presented  by 
the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  and  the  vast  amount  of  oral 
testimony  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Interoceanic  Affairs.  I 
am  confident  that  the  minority  judgment  is  the  better  and  that  it  can 

41 


be  more  relied  upon,  because  it  is  strictly  in  conformity  with  the  entire 
history  of  the  Isthmian  canal  project.  I  am  confident  that  the  objec- 
tions which  have  been  raised  against  the  lock  plan  are  an  undue 
exaggeration  of  difficulties  such  as  are  inherent  in  every  great  engi- 
neering project,  and  which,  I  have  not  the  slightest  doubt,  will  be 
successfully  solved  by  American  engineers,  in  the  light  of  American 
experience,  exactly  as  similar  difficulties  have  been  solved  in  many 
other  enterprises  of  great  magnitude. 

I  am  not  impressed  with  the  reasons  and  arguments  advanced  by 
those  who  favor  the  sea-level  project,  for  they  do  not  appeal  to  me  as 
being  sound,  and  in  some  instances  they  come  perilously  near  to  being 
engineering  guesswork  characteristic  of  the  earlier  enterprises  of  De 
Lesseps.  I  cannot  but  think  that  bias  and  prejudice  are  largely  re- 
sponsible for  the  judgment  of  foreign  engineers  so  pronounced  in  favor 
of  a  sea-level  project.  Fiu*thermore,  I  am  entirely  convinced  that  the 
judgment  and  experience  of  American  engineers  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal 
may  be  relied  upon  with  entire  confidence,  and  that  such  an  enterprise 
will  bebrought  to  a  successful  termination.  I  believe  that  in  a  national 
undertaking  of  this  kind,  fraught  with  the  gravest  possible  political  and 
commercial  consequences,  only  the  judgment  of  our  own  people  should 
govern,  for  the  protection  of  our  own  interests,  which  are  primarily  at 
stake.  I  also  prefer  to  accept  the  view  and  convictions  of  the  members 
of  the  Isthmian  Commission,  and  of  its  chief  engineer,  a  man  of 
extraordinary  ability  and  large  experience. 

It  is  a  subject  upon  which  opinions  will  differ  and  upon  which 
honest  convictions  may  be  widely  at  variance,  but  in  a  question  of  such 
surpassing  importance  to  the  nation,  I,  for  one,  shall  side  with  those 
who  take  the  American  point  of  view,  place  their  reliance  upon  Amer- 
ican experience,  and  show  their  faith  in  American  engineers. 


42 


n 


THE  PRUDKNTlAIv  INSURANCE  COMPANY  OF  AMERICA 


Incorporated  under  the  laws  of  the  State  of  New  Jersey 

FORREST  F.  DRYDEN,  President 

HOIviE  OFFICE.  NEV/ARK.  NEW  JERSEY 


